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No 5, September-October 1987

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[The following is a translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated.]

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SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

Human Factor in Acceleration (Preliminary Elaboration of Sociological Theory)

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 87 (signed
to press 8 Sep 87) pp 11-18

[Article by Gennadiy Vasilyevich Osipov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, head of the Department of the Methodology and History of Sociology of the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, author of the books "Tekhnika i obshchestvennyy progress" [Technology and Social Progress] (1959), "Avtomatizatsiya v SSSR" [Automation in the USSR] (1961), "Metody izmereniya v sotsiologii" [Methods of Sociological Measurement] (1977, co-authored), "Sotsiologiya" [Sociology] (1969), "Teoriya i praktika sotsiologicheskikh issledovaniy v SSSR" [Theory and Practice of Sociological Research in the USSR] (1979), and others, and one of our permanent contributing authors]

[Text] The level of development and the functioning of the social sphere of Soviet society leave much to be desired. The mounting social differences combined with the distinct tendency toward the economic equalization of the main population groups and strata, the declining prestige and low productivity of labor, the unsatisfactory state of the service sphere, the systematically reproduced shortages of even substandard goods, crime, alcohol abuse, drug addiction, prostitution and other types of antisocial behavior, and the departmental attacks on nature and on the material culture of the past are all social problems of great concern to the public. Their constant reproduction, and even expanded reproduction in some cases, is arousing anxiety and giving rise to social passivity and insecurity.

The crisis in the social development of the country is something largely engendered and stimulated by the critical state of the economy. The strict regulation, which is contrary to objective laws and to common sense, and production for the sake of production or for the sake of formal plan fulfillment caused deadlocks in economic and social development. The main ways of emerging from the state of crisis in the economy have already been determined. These are the transfer to cost accounting and the institution and improvement, on the basis of practical experience, of the mechanisms of self-funding, with the profit margin as its main indicator.

We feel that it is hardly likely, however, that all problems, especially social ones, can be solved by economic means alone. The theory of "economic" determinism did not work in practice. The economy functions in the social context and not only determines the potential for development in the social sphere but is also influenced by this sphere. The movement of goods is accomplished through the efforts of people, who do this in order to satisfy their own personal needs and interests. This is

why the point of departure for the reorganization of the entire system of social relations in accordance with the general party line elaborated at the 27th CPSU Congress is not the socioeconomic structure and organizational forms, but the individual, his attitude toward society and the state, other people and himself, his needs and interests, his values and aims.

Reorganization begins with the reorganization of thinking, mental reorganization, the denial of old stereotypes and social aims. This is how it differs radically from all of the previous reforms which required colossal material expenditures and had a negligible economic and social impact. From the sociological standpoint, perestroika means the elaboration of a new way of thinking, social thinking as well as economic thinking, and the philosophical basis of this new way of thinking will be the abandonment of all remaining traces of the metaphysical materialism that became popular in the middle of the 20th century in the form of structural functionalism, with its postulate that "the individual is the product of the system." This fundamental premise suggested that all problems in society's development could be solved primarily through the improvement of economic, social, and political structures and organizational and legal forms. It was precisely the creation of new but equally impersonal structures and organizational forms, approaching the highest ideal, that was seen as the cure for all symptoms of crisis and stagnation.

Viewing the individual only as the product of the system, explaining all of his activity as the result of his objective status in a given structure, and using this to determine his needs and interests, his values and ambitions, represent only half the process. The idealization of impersonal structures and organizational and legal forms ignores the fact that they themselves are the result of human activity and that they begin functioning and acquiring social existence only when they are "filled" with real people and are set in motion by individuals or groups of individuals. The human being is not only the product of the system—the systems themselves are the product of human activity. The individual is the result and the cause of the socially significant actions (both positive and negative) committed within the confines of the given system. Social relations and the individual, representing the total group of these relations, are not an attribute of some kind of impersonal systems and their structural elements; systems find self-expression through the social qualities of individuals. Objective determination—i.e., the system's influence on the individual—has an indissoluble connection with subjective determination—the individual's effect on the system. And the problem consists in determining the degree to which the economic, social, political, and ideological systems created by the human being take his needs and interests into consideration (and these can also suffer from stagnation) and promote the display of human individuality and creativity. Whereas profit is the most important criterion of the effectiveness of the economic sphere of society, the criterion in the social sphere is the total

group of conditions creating opportunities for the realization of the individuality and creative potential of each human being. The main purpose of socialist reforms consists in emancipating the abilities of each individual, the potential the "bourgeoisie suppressed, discouraged, and stifled"[1]. Creativity is not only a sign of individuality but also a major factor in socioeconomic, scientific, and technical progress. Unfortunately, this policy statement by V.I. Lenin has been virtually forgotten.

Whenever the ability, understanding, and knowledge of what must be done to solve a specific problem (scientific, social, or economic) are lacking, priority is assigned to something requiring no special knowledge or great mental effort—structural and organizational changes. The resolution of any problem is made dependent on the creation of new organizational structures and a larger staff and the acquisition of additional funds. This results in the multiplication of ministries, departments, and establishments with huge staffs and stronger bureaucratic influence in all spheres of social life. Bureaucracy is becoming a real social force (from 85 to 95 percent of the respondents in sociological surveys believe that they have to deal with bureaucratic opposition whenever they try to solve any problem).¹ Great care is taken to create the semblance of vigorous activity, interest in social welfare, and the observance of laws. Structures and organizational forms are changed, but scientific and technical progress and the socioeconomic development of society slow down and gradually begin to show the signs of crisis and stagnation that are incompatible with socialism.

This kind of situation arises when individuals and groups of individuals are incapable of solving problems engendered by changing economic, social, political, and ideological conditions. Stagnation is not the result of some kind of impersonal economic or social structure or economic or social institution, but a result of the misguided activity of many individuals and social groups. By the same token, a change in the content and nature of human activity and the creation of the necessary conditions for the display of their creative potential represent, in our opinion, the most important factor limiting or completely eliminating the processes robbing the individual of his individuality and deforming his social actions. The accelerated socioeconomic development of society occurs when each person represents not an impersonal role or status in a specific structure, but the kind of individuality that is displayed even under the most unfavorable conditions. As an individual he is unique, even though he is endowed with features common to all the members of a specific social group (national, ethnic, family, labor, age, etc.). It is individuality that is the basis of innovative actions and unique contributions to the development of human culture, whereas common features and repeated actions contribute to the preservation of the existing culture and its traditions and to their transmission to each new generation. Development itself, interpreted as the reinforcement of qualitative elements and the introduction of new

ones into the culture, depends on individual creativity and on the unique characteristics of the individual.

The inclusion of individuals in existing or new systems or organizations presupposes their precise fulfillment of prescribed role requirements. If this does not happen, all of the blame, according to some scientists, is laid on the organizational flaws of structures and the problem is perpetuated. It is no secret that the history of several liberal arts institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the last few decades is a series of useless structural changes. Attempts to solve scientific problems connected, for example, with the development of social theory or the reinforcement of its connection with practice only by means of structural reforms or the creation of new organizational units, "consolidation and deconsolidation," and staff cuts followed by excessive staff appointments, are pseudo-activity, pseudo-perestroika, or, more precisely, the sabotage of perestroika, and have given science nothing.

The reduced effectiveness of existing structures and the appearance of symptoms of crisis and stagnation in their development deform human activity. There are several reasons for this. First of all, there is the abovementioned adherence of some people to discredited theories and concepts ("economic," "organizational," or "structural" determinism). Second, institutions of socialization and education which were incapable of developing human creativity and individuality must assume much of the blame. Third, there are the strict regulation of economic activity (especially managerial activity) in line with a huge number of formal indicators assigning priority to the gross product—whether in the production of goods or the "production" of people (engineers, for example), the tendency to nullify the tangible impact of a particular system (profit, for example), the disregard for the social criteria of economic activity, and the absence of social statistics. Finally, there are the organizational structures restricting the display of ability, ingenuity, and creativity.

At the highest levels of administration, the society strives for the welfare of all and, above all, for the creation of the necessary conditions for the fullest possible satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of all its members. The main principle of the development of the socialist society—everything for the sake of the individual, everything for the good of the individual—becomes a meaningless phrase, however, when priority is assigned to personal and departmental interests. It is in line with these interests that production is accomplished for the sake of production, and not for the sake of the individual and his real needs—for the sake of the gross indicator, and not for the sake of product quality. If the plan is fulfilled or overfulfilled, all expenses, even those connected with the disruption of the economic balance or with social and moral defects, are automatically written off. This form of adaptability essentially leads to the

stagnation of the system and acquires antisocial features. In spite of external signs of success, the system begins to work against the interests of society.

Society reduces work hours to provide more free time for the all-round development of the individual, but this time, as the data of sociological studies testify, is quickly devoured by the service sphere. Efficiency proposals and inventions are known to be encouraged in our society, and managers report a colossal number of efficiency proposals and inventions each year. In reality, however, up to 80 percent of the serious inventions are rejected by industry[4]. Excessively formalized requirements of plan fulfillment and gross production impede scientific and technical progress, socially significant displays of individuality, and the self-development of systems. Systems adapt to the requirements of society not by improvement, but with purely external changes.

The need to adapt to these requirements inevitably causes managers to lose their individuality. Any of their actions which lead objectively to the social disorganization of society are justified by the allegation that they are doing the same thing as all other members of the given managerial group, and supposedly for the common good. This is the reason for the common material and moral consequences of this activity: crops left in the fields, inoperable equipment, unused equipment, and surplus stocks of raw materials.

If the system stimulates the display of creativity and innovation and establishes the necessary conditions for their rapid implementation, its functioning and development will be free of perceptible internal contradictions and negative consequences. This statement is not confined to the economic, social, or political spheres. It also applies to spiritual life—science, art, and literature. Therefore, individuality is not only the greatest treasure the human being has acquired over centuries of evolution but also the greatest blessing of society. And if the society cannot or will not make use of this blessing, it is doomed to stagnation.

The role of the individual can vary in each specific situation. On the one hand, at turning points in the development of society, when opportunities for the display of individuality are created (for example, the October Revolution, the civil war, and the first five-year plans), this is the most important factor of qualitative changes in the society. On the other hand, the restriction of displays of individuality and compulsory conformity inhibit social progress and contribute to the social and moral degradation of the individual. Signs of stagnation and negative developments usually become apparent wherever a high percentage of the people included in a specific organizational structure wholly and completely subordinate their potential to restrictive norms and official and unofficial prescriptions and consciously or unconsciously adapt to the existing situation or objective conditions—i.e., lose their individuality. But this is only part of the problem. Another part is more dangerous and

alarming. Adaptation to existing objective and subjective conditions and the rejection of innovations do not represent a move from the individual to the social, but a departure from both, the leveling and deformation of both the social and the individual. Adaptation to the long-established and immutable leads to the gradual loss of independent thinking and the subordination of individual behavior to mass behavior. This heightened adaptability, resulting from the loss of individuality, plays a significant role in intensifying and aggravating signs of stagnation and the social contradictions giving rise to antisocial behavior.

The reaction to these developments when they become a social fact is usually confined to criticism of the chief culprits, who imposed, "from above," certain structures and organizational forms that did not withstand the test of time (for example, the division of obkoms into rural and industrial), or of the incompetence, lack of discipline, and passivity of the individuals who introduced disruptive elements into the system "from below." No one is questioning the need for this criticism. This kind of criticism creates an emotional atmosphere, molds public opinion, and aids in the assessment of the state of crisis. But it also contributes, whether we want it to or not, to rote decisions and the creation of a vicious social circle. Some organizational structures are replaced by others and some individuals are replaced by others, but there is no change for the better.

There is also another important aspect to the loss of individuality. In essence, the accuracy of decisions is above suspicion if the masses agree to them, regardless of whether they understand or do not understand the nature and content of social changes. This violates the basic principle of social policy, which can be conducted successfully only when it is an accurate reflection of what the people can realize. The allegation that most of the population of the USSR agrees with and welcomes the perestroika not only misrepresents the real process but is also directed essentially against the perestroika. This is an example of how social apologetics can easily be substituted for science.

The perestroika is a contradictory process. And it would be wrong to believe that everyone knows what has to be done and is striving to transform this knowledge into socioeconomic reality. The perestroika is encountering a peculiar kind of opposition which confines reforms to declarations or pseudo-new organizational structures without even considering the crux of the matter. In this case, some ways of restricting individuality are being replaced by others. The perestroika itself is being reduced to mere ideological rhetoric, which will not stop the objective processes leading to the creation of signs of crisis and stagnation, but will only intensify them.

This kind of rhetoric must be resolutely rejected. Specific decisions on the reorganization of economic, social, and other relations must be preceded by the careful and thorough study of past experience. This is where science

can play the main role. "Studying is the job of the scientist, and here, because we have been concerned precisely with practical experience rather than with general principles for a long time now, even a bourgeois, but knowledgeable, 'specialist in science and technology' would be ten times as valuable to us as the swaggering communist who is ready at any time of the day or night to write 'theses,' invent 'slogans,' and present us with meaningless abstractions"[2, pp 346-347].

And we must admit that we have a great multitude of "swaggering communists," dilettantes, and bureaucrats in the sciences. Their emotional rhetoric frequently conceals their "latent opposition" to development and progress. The criticism of real or imaginary culprits responsible for crises and stagnation engenders a huge army of time-servers who blame imaginary others for what they themselves asserted yesterday and for which, taking advantage of the prerogatives of authority, they punished others as dissidents. Furthermore, these time-servers assume the role of judges expressing public opinion in the name of social justice and the public interest.

The important thing about the current perestroika, as the most important revolutionary process since Great October, is that it, for the first time in our country's history, is not only creating the necessary emotional atmosphere and exposing toadies and time-servers, but is also giving structural changes and real human potential thorough consideration. The emotional fervor of the perestroika is creating the proper moral atmosphere for beings with no individuality to become highly individualized personalities.

The loss of individuality means the renunciation of personal views and the undiscerning acceptance of the behavioral standards of the given social group or standards decreed "from above." The bureaucrat, the drug addict, and the prostitute, as people with no individuality occupying different positions in the social hierarchy, have similar psychological characteristics: extremely stereotyped thinking and behavior, professional jargon, a meager vocabulary, clearly defined individualism, and indifference to their surroundings. Belonging to a community creates feelings of solidarity and psychological comfort and a sense of security. This is usually combined with hatred for real or imaginary enemies. Under these conditions, creative debate or other forms of rational influence and scientific arguments are out of the question. The inner stability of these groups is foremost in the minds of their members, and they oppose any new ideas and any kind of progress. If the person lacks individuality, his social position can be discussed only in the form of a dichotomy—to be or not to be. And if it is to be, then opposing or conflicting points of view cannot be allowed. Here the plan is used to conceal economic instability and "loyalty to Marxism-Leninism," often interpreted to fit the given situation—i.e., pragmatically misinterpreted—is used to conceal ideological instability.

The practice of socialist construction pointed up the urgent need to coordinate the roles of the popular masses and the individual in contemporary socioeconomic, scientific, technical, and cultural development. Now the masses are playing a more important role, and no one is objecting to this, but the discoveries in various spheres and branches of our society's life and work are made by creative individuals or groups of individuals united for the resolution of a specific problem. The development of social life depends primarily on their abilities and their active approach to matters.

All of the reorganizations of the past began with the criticism of organizational systems, institutions, and managers. People spoke of the problems of democratization and idealized the popular masses, regarding them as a tangible force with the ability to eliminate negative phenomena. This is how it was done in the past. Today, however, it is time to eliminate the organizational systems and mechanisms that hampered individual creativity and to establish the kind of legal forms which will allow this creativity to be used for the resolution of socioeconomic and political problems. The masses can become a great driving force of acceleration when each person is able to express himself as an individual.

Signs of crisis and stagnation are the products of the system, but criticism itself cannot change the system. Science must play an important role in this process.

Material, economic, and legal-organizational elements are set in motion by people; by the same token, the functioning of any sphere of society—economic, political, or purely social—depends primarily on them. The characteristics of these people, their abilities, knowledge, capabilities, character, and social qualities, determine the characteristics of the system. Is it possible, for example, for the organizational structure of an industrial enterprise to function efficiently when, according to sociological research, 50 percent of the highly skilled workers and 30-40 percent of the people with a higher education are performing jobs not corresponding to their qualifications? Or when the assigned duties of 40-45 percent of the engineers do not correspond to the nature of creative labor because the majority are engaged in keeping equipment operating normally and serving management (30 percent and 56 percent respectively)? Only 10 percent of all specialists are engaged in the development of new technological systems and the incorporation of modern scientific achievements in modern industrial production. Around 80 percent of the people surveyed, however, want to work on independent and complex engineering projects, but only 20 percent actually have this kind of opportunity. Opportunities for the display of personal ability in the sphere of management are also limited: 49 percent expressed a willingness to participate in management, 53 percent were formally included in it, but only 22 percent were actually participating.²

We could cite many other examples to confirm the existence of an imbalance between the organizational structure and the social qualities of the people involved

in its functioning. There have been many cases in industry when perfectly designed systems have fallen apart solely because of the incompetence of managers or rank-and-file workers and their lack of awareness of the purpose and goals of their activity. The reorganization of social relations is possible only when it is initiated "by the very people involved in the social relations requiring correction or modification"[3].

There are still many people, in our opinion, who subscribe to the mistaken belief that if wages are high enough—i.e., if they can motivate conscientious labor—and if the rules regulating the behavior of people are observed strictly and precisely, the system will function effectively. In reality, a system will function in exactly the same way as individuals, whose performance depends on many more factors than those making up the system.

Under the conditions of the perestroika, it will be the function of the science of sociology to determine the degree to which the organizational-legal forms created by people take their needs into consideration, and also to reveal the extent to which they promote the display of human individuality and the practical use of the individual's knowledge, potential, and creative abilities. This is why the transfer of the Soviet society from one qualitative state to another and higher state is essentially a matter of transforming the ideal into an objective reality through the thorough consideration of human potential and the expansion of the sphere for the display of individuality. If this does not happen, the disrupting processes in the system will become irreversible, supplemented by the social and moral deformation of the individual. This is how stagnant and negative tendencies become realities today.

During the perestroika period it will be the duty of sociology to disclose concrete mechanisms for the correspondence and coordination of system-related qualities (existing, improving, or just emerging) and individual (social and psychological) personality traits and reveal mechanisms promoting the optimal combination of objective and subjective, general and particular factors in the country's socioeconomic development. This, in turn, presupposes the perestroika of sociology itself and the revision of old views of its status in the social sciences and liberal arts. Sociology in our country has had to travel as difficult a road as genetics. Until recently it has been regarded as not much more than an undiscerning imitation of bourgeois science. Sociology was first associated with historical materialism and then released from this framework; it was within the boundaries of an applied discipline and then raised to the level of a social science. Sociology is still waiting to be acknowledged as an independent science of society. The successes and influence of Marxist social thinking, however, have been due largely to the expansion of its scientific base and the inclusion of sociology among the Marxist sciences of society.

The perestroika of sociology will entail the renunciation of social apologetics and a move to the scientific and discerning investigation of reality and to the resolution of real problems in theory and practice.

Footnotes

1. Surveys were conducted by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences from 1980 to 1984 as part of the "Indicators of Social Development in the USSR" research project. The sample group consisted of 10,000 respondents.
2. Data from the previously mentioned research.

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3. Lenin, V.I., "The Economic Implications of Populism and Its Criticism in Mr. Struve's Book," *ibid.*, vol 1, pp 387-388.

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Conservative Syndrome

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to press 8 Sep 87) pp 19-30

[Article by Leonid Grigoryevich Ionin, doctor of philosophical sciences, senior research associate at the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, and author of the monographs "Comprehensive Sociology" (1978) and "Georg Simmel—Sociologist" (1981) and of the following articles in our journal: "Criticism of the Social Psychology of George Mead and Its Contemporary Interpretations" (1975, No 1), "Where Is American Phenomenological Sociology Headed" (1976, No 2), "Fascism—Pathology of History" (1986, No 4), "...And the Past Will Issue a Summons" (1987, No 3), and others]

[Text] The resolution of the current problems connected with perestroika and the renewal of socialist society will be impossible, as our accumulated experience tells us, until we take stock of our politico-ideological baggage. A similar situation already arose in our country's history. In 1922 V.I. Lenin wrote: "The main thing now is not to give up our old gains. We will not give up a single one of our old gains. At the same time, we are facing a completely new problem; the old could become a direct

impediment"[1, p 305]. He said this about the contradictions between the requirements of the new political and socioeconomic situation in the country and the possibilities created by the ideological and organizational forms and the style and method of party and government leadership that took shape during the period of military communism and the civil war.

Today, as we enter a new phase in the development of the socialist society, we are again encountering distinct conservative tendencies—the "old" that could be a "direct impediment" to advancement. When M.S. Gorbachev made his historic speech at the January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, he named the different signs of conservatism in sociopolitical thinking and actual behavior: the absolutization of forms of social organization which took shape as a result of practice and were then essentially equated with salient features of socialism, regarded as immutable entities, and portrayed as dogma leaving no room for objective analysis; lightweight ideas about communism and various types of prophecies and abstract judgments [2, pp 8-9]. This conservative combination of pseudo-scientific dogmatism and ideological hysterics was founded on vigorous activity: the continuous growth of the administrative staff and the multiplication of ministries, committees, councils, and commissions aspiring to encompass everything and everyone and producing an infinite number of decisions, frequently without any consideration for actual capabilities. Irresponsibility spread rapidly, various types of bureaucratic rules and instructions were invented, and authoritarian commands, a pretense of efficiency, and mountains of paperwork took the place of real action.

All of this was a result of a specific type of practical ideology which, on the one hand, vindicated inaction and overconfidence, and, on the other, created excuses for extremely vigorous but socially counterproductive administrative "work." For several decades this ideology ruled the thoughts and actions of many people responsible for making decisions. It was based on an odd combination of two seemingly mutually exclusive approaches to social life: the *rational-technocratic* and the *sacrosanct-organic*, which combined to make up a unique conservative syndrome whose effects on the economy, politics, science, the arts—on literally all spheres of life—are now impeding perestroika. We will examine the ways in which this combination affected our lives and the historical origins of the conservative practical ideology which aspired for a long time to the role of the only scientific and genuinely Marxist ideology.

I recently overheard a conversation between two sociologists who were discussing the topic "What Is Impeding Perestroika?" One summarized the general approach to the problem: "Let us consider," he said, "the main spheres of social life subject to scientific control: technological, economic, legal, social, and so forth." After naming perhaps all of the possible spheres, he thought

for a moment and then said: "Now all we have to do is take hold of the groups which have slipped out of the administrative sphere, and everything will be perfect."

What he was actually expressing was one form of the administrative ideology that has been so popular in our philosophical-sociological literature in the last two decades. I would call it technocratic. According to this line of reasoning, all of the main theoretical problems have already been solved. The two problems remaining are essentially of a practical rather than a theoretical nature: the disclosure of the groups and individuals who somehow slipped through the fairly dense administrative network; the exertion of stronger ideological, political, and economic pressure on these groups. There is the assumption that the ends and means of administration are to be defined exclusively by specialists; the actual administrators are supposed to be passive parties, something like an object to be manipulated. The purpose of administration is to put the entire social system in a state corresponding ideally to the purposes of the system, which are also defined by specialists in administration. In general, this theory essentially says that specialists are the best judges of how things should be done, and therefore they should choose the methods; specialists are the best judges of what the human being is, and therefore they should decide what he needs and does not need. Because their decisions are automatically correct, they can include a certain degree of coercion in administration, or even the use of force, because it will serve the noble purpose of making things what they should be.

The ideology of technocratic administration originally rested on an understanding of the objective laws of the development and functioning of society. The word "rested" is used here in the literal sense. These laws were to serve as pillars, as firm and unyielding islands in the fluid, variable, and easily influenced sea of reality.

We can single out two elements of this theoretical system: 1) the objective law, manifesting itself with the immutability of a law of nature, irrespective of individual efforts and the goals and objectives of individual activity, and 2) specific measures to attain specific social goals, based on a knowledge and use of these objective laws.

In general, the system seemed valid. A closer look, however, revealed certain flaws. First of all, it was based on the illusion of the possibility of the consistent and strict centralized administration of all social processes without exception, from those on the lowest level to those at the top. We will call this the illusion of total control. "As socialism develops," one of the authors of this theory wrote, "the volume and depth of the use of objective laws are augmented and the volume and significance of spontaneous regulators are diminished." He also admitted the exact limits of total control by saying that "given the current level of technical and scientific development, some natural forces remain uncontrollable and are having a perceptible effect on the development

of several economic sectors, especially agriculture. In addition, prices on the kolhoz market, marriages, people's tastes and needs, and so forth cannot be regulated strictly."

These seemingly incidental remarks—the list of everything that still is not subject to administrative influences—reveal a fundamental flaw in the line of reasoning of the ideologists of total control. For example, the regrettable uncontrollability of natural phenomena must be neutralized, obviously, not by stronger administrative influence, but, rather, by weaker influence—the elimination of the directive style of agricultural management, which seems to take no notice of the spontaneity of these natural phenomena. But this approach would undermine the very foundations of the ideology of total control with this concession to "spontaneity" (in every sense of the term). The distinctly regretful tone of the remark that "tastes and needs" are subject to only partial regulation also exposes the ideal of comprehensive regulation lying behind the humanitarian slogan that "scientific administration is administration 'for the common good.'" This is probably an anti-utopia, something like the society described by Ye. Zamyatin in his novel "My" [We] or by V. Nabokov in "Priglaseniye na kazn" [Invitation to an Execution].

In Nabokov's novel, for example, one of the rules for the inmate of the municipal prison says that he must not have, or must immediately suppress, "nocturnal dreams whose content might be incompatible with the condition and status of the prisoner, such as: resplendent landscapes, outings with friends, family dinners, as well as sexual intercourse with persons who in real life and in the waking state would not suffer said individual to come near, which individual will therefore be considered by the law to be guilty of rape."

The amazing wording of this rule reveals a desire to control the inner man, particularly his tastes and needs. But it also points up another feature of the ideology of total control that warrants special consideration. This is the rationalized and extremely oversimplified view of the functioning of various controlled and managed systems (the law and morality, for example) and the lack of understanding of the differences between these systems—a lack of understanding which is unfortunately found too often in the accepted practice of making aesthetic tastes and ideological convictions a matter of concern for law enforcement agencies. In Nabokov's grotesque world, thoughts and dreams are punishable crimes. The seemingly absurd wording of this rule has profound implications.

Therefore, the illusion of total control and the tendency to overlook or deliberately ignore the distinctive features of various systems of administration and control are obvious flaws of the technocratic administrative ideology. There are also other flaws: the inevitability of the colossal growth of the scales of administration, requiring a gigantic and constantly growing army of bureaucrats;

the passive role of the laboring masses, who only accept administrative decisions. The passive role of laborers is not an incidental flaw of the technocratic administrative ideology, but its defining feature: Technocracy is the opposite of democracy. The system is not self-administered, but administered from outside, by technocratic specialists "from above." It is not surprising that the theorists of this current, who pedantically list and categorize the functions, hierarchy, and levers of administration, find a place for "labor collectives" somewhere at the very end of their lists and think of them as one element of the administrative hierarchy.

All of these are what might be called the formal characteristics of technocratic administration or total control, but we should also take a look at the objective laws on which various forms of administrative influence are based. Obviously, they are different in each sphere "subject to" administration, but the ideology as a whole rests on a few general assumptions or postulates, which are sometimes not even formulated precisely. They represent the substantive side or the general guidelines of the entire system of administration.

The first is the law of the harmonious combination of general and particular interests in the socialist society. Measures taken in the society's interest (which was generally equated with the state interest) were thought to automatically satisfy the interests of each of the groups making up the society and, eventually, each individual. The second is the law of the constant enhancement of the welfare of citizens in the socialist society. Because this was an objective law with automatic and unavoidable effects, even the raising of prices could be interpreted—and was interpreted—as an action intended to enhance welfare (either because it made the lowering of the prices of another group of commodities possible, or because it created benefits for another social group, as a result of which—given the postulate of harmonious combination—it would also benefit those who had to pay more). The third was the law of the infallibility of the highest levels of administration, which operated on the basis of objective laws and inevitably or even unconsciously caused a chain of historical events favoring the society. All of these laws were not simply objective, but objectively optimistic. In general, they were based on a widespread but essentially vulgarized view of the advantages of socialism, in accordance with which any social measure in the socialist system was progressive and would benefit the society and all of its members, while the same measure in capitalist countries would be reactionary and would have the most negative effects on the laboring public.

How did this mechanism work? There are countless examples. Here are just a few.

For a long time we did not regard the conservation of natural resources as a problem. The undiscerning and vulgar ideas about the advantages of socialism were to blame. In brief, the line of reasoning was the following:

Large-scale conservation measures are impossible in the capitalist society, where private ownership, even of the land, prevails; furthermore, the emphasis on profits makes conservation inconvenient.

This was contrasted with the advantages of socialism: public ownership of the means of production and the absence of private property interests, which would automatically exclude the possibility of harmful effects of industrial activity. On this basis, ecological issues were disregarded, and the wealth of resources, huge territorial dimensions, and comparatively low concentration of production which masked the severity of the problem for a long time were credited to the advantages of our system, which was supposedly our guarantee against regrettable developments.

Public health care is another example. All activity in public health has always been based on a fundamental postulate which could be regarded as a variation on one of the basic laws listed above: The level of public health (both physical and mental) constantly rises in the socialist society. For a long time this "law" was empirically, so to speak, confirmed by huge investments in the organization of medical care, the construction of medical establishments, the expansion of medical education, etc. Effective measures eliminated many diseases. These successes were not seen as the result of the work of specific people and specific measures, however, but as the result of the advantages of socialism, which supposedly influenced each individual by filling him with optimism, representing the basis of indestructible spiritual health, which, in turn, represented a guarantee of physical health.

The successes in public health, however, were followed quite rapidly by acute problems. Tendencies common to the entire industrial world, reinforced in part by distinctive features, threatened to undermine beliefs about the automatic advantages of socialism. As a result of the appropriate administrative measures, medical statistics were made confidential, creating new opportunities for the self-reinforcement of "objective laws," and essentially for social demagoguery.

In other words, the totally unrestricted administration resting on "objectively optimistic" ideas about the laws of development frequently turns into authoritarian administration, corroborating the very beliefs on which it is based.

The combination of all this suggests something about the nature of the practical ideology on which administrative activity in our society was based for a long time. It is founded on two externally conflicting but actually closely interacting and mutually supplementary principles: 1) the technocratic principle of arbitrary authoritarianism, creating the illusion of the unlimited possibilities and ease of reforms, and 2) the sacred "organic" principle, allowing for, by virtue of the acknowledgement of "objective advantages," the substantiation of

the accuracy and expediency of any kind of activity, regardless of its social implications. This combination of technocratic arbitrary practices and their "organic" substantiation represents the *conservative syndrome* which takes so many forms in social reality.

This naturally gives rise to some questions: To what degree are the combination and interaction of the two principles making up the "syndrome" possible? What are the objective implications of activity geared to both of these principles simultaneously? After all, the conflict between the procedures of thinking and acting dictated by each principle is immediately apparent. The technocratic approach presupposes a belief in technical rationality, the choice of the optimal means for the quickest and least expensive attainment of objectives. From the technocratic standpoint, every single detail of reality can be analyzed and understood (and, consequently, controlled). The organic principle, on the other hand, dictates a completely different method of thinking, a different line of reasoning. The organic concept presupposes the existence of metaphysics founded on the "sanctification" of a specific sphere of existence and the acknowledgement of an indecomposable nucleus constituting the basis of all rational judgments and acts. We are dealing with a dichotomy: sacrosanct—rational. When these two principles interact, the characteristics of each are transferred to the other. As a result, technocratic rationality is "sanctified"—i.e., in its existing, current and, consequently, historical transient form, it acquired the features of a metaphysically necessary, eternal, and essential characteristic of the phenomenon. In turn, rationality casts its reflection on the organic and sacrosanct; the latter is "rationalized" and appears to lose its inherent religious features (although it actually keeps them). The result is, on the one hand, "sanctified" rationality and, on the other, rationally substantiated "sanctity."

The recent past offers countless examples of this strange combination. For example, the widely publicized concept of developed socialism was supposed to lay a rational foundation for the idea of the organic integrity of institutions, forms, and methods of social activity. At the same time, the completely rational and pragmatic activity of functionaries was "sanctified" by the authority of the socialist establishments they represented.

This combination appears to be the very essence of the "half-baked socialist conservatism" described by S. Zalygin [3]. It is also the source of the extremely tenacious and dangerous socialist form of bureaucratism, in which existing institutions, forms, and structures of activity begin to be viewed not from the standpoint of organizational rationality but as the embodiment of the sacred organic principle. Under these conditions even the most arbitrary actions are sanctified. On the other hand, when elements of the sacrosanct are rationalized, they enter the orbit of bureaucratic organizations and lose their metaphysical nature. In both cases real human activity becomes only a semblance of action, and social

forces are wasted in rote procedures. This situation is illustrated vividly by an incident reported recently in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA [4]. Famous people, some of our illustrious countrymen, were listed among the members of fishing boat crews as honorary seamen—in particular, Nikolay Ostrovskiy, Pavka Korchagin, and Prince Maksutov, the lieutenant of the frigate "Avrora" who was present at the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka defense in 1856. Their inclusion was accompanied by all of the necessary formalities: They were paid a salary, which was deposited in the Peace Fund "with their written consent," they went on vacation, they took days off, etc. When the time for staff reductions arrived, the honorary crew members were dismissed, as the newspaper reported, "at their own request." Lieutenant Maksutov "resigned" and Pavka Korchagin "left" the propaganda ship "Korchaginets."

The newspaper correspondent justifiably commented on the excesses of formalism and bureaucratism in Komsomol work in this context. The crux of the matter, however, seems to lie deeper: These absurd events are a clear illustration of the interaction of the sacred and rational principles in a social organization. This is a case of revered people who have been rationalized and included in the bureaucratic orbit. With the aid of these symbols, the bureaucratic image of Komsomol activity acquired a sacred aura.

This absurd practice, which took shape before the eyes of many people, seemed senseless from the societal standpoint, but several of the organizations involved were reaping dividends from the "honorary seamen": the Komsomol, which supposedly displayed some activity in the patriotic indoctrination of youth, and the fleet administration, which was able to make staff reductions without reducing the catch. In this case, the activities of these organizations were conducted in a vicious circle, consisting literally in milling the wind. The sanctification of Komsomol bureaucratism and the simultaneous rationalization of symbols sacred to us effectively blocked possible changes and improvements in organizational and economic activity, performing a conserving, or conservative, role.

Here we have come up against phenomena of the same type on a much broader, sometimes even statewide scale: the creation of the semblance of success, the semblance of activity, with no influence whatsoever on real socio-economic processes, which expire because of a lack of creative inspiration.

The incident described in the newspaper reminds us of Yu. Tynyanov's story "Second Lieutenant Kizhe." The story of Second Lieutenant Kizhe is usually interpreted as a satire of bureaucracy. But it also has a deeper meaning: The character of the second lieutenant "took shape" and "grew strong" through proximity to the sacred—i.e., to the throne. If the emperor had not overheard his name, there would have been no story. If the names of the honorary crew members had not been

sacred to us, the discussion in the newspaper report would have dealt with bureaucratic negligence at best and the abuse of authority at worst.

The comparison of these two stories motivates us to take a look at our history and trace the origins and development of the sacred and rational principles discussed above.

The birth of the technocratic doctrine of the rational organization of society is associated with Saint-Simon's view of society as a huge workshop where each member would do what he was best suited to do and where the product of collective labor would be social life as a whole. The common organizing element was an industrial elite. When Marx and Engels adopted and reworked Saint-Simon's socialist ideas, they discarded his technocratism. Later it became the direct opposite of socialism, because technocratic ideologists were pursuing the goal of the rational organization of society on an undemocratic, elitist basis; in technocratic theories laborers were assigned the role of workers in the workshop, while the management of production (and, what is most important, social) processes was to be the job of (in early theories) industrialists and (later) managers.

Technocratism emphasized the need for the rational organization of society, but this rationality itself was interpreted as technological or, at best, technical-economic or production rationality. Personal interests, inclinations, and creative needs were not taken into account, and the human being was regarded as a cog in the social machine. V.I. Lenin rejected technocracy in favor of democracy. After October the technocratic ideology was revived by A. Bogdanov, the inventor of "techtology," a comprehensive organizational science, and by several development projects in the sociology of labor and industrial sociology (by A. Gastev and others). This revival was no coincidence: The planned economy provided a chance—and, what is more, created a need—for the systematic analysis and rational organization of the economy and the interaction of all its facets. The maximum rationalization of social processes, however, created the danger that the interests and qualities of specific individuals would be ignored or denied. On the surface, technocracy represented a passion for construction, efficiency, and organization. Its other side, however, was total manipulation. Until the end of the 1920's the ideas of the technocratic rationalization of society were tested and adjusted in the USSR by the objective of constant and increasing democratization.

Technocratic ideas were not popular in Russia before the revolution. The "organic" interpretation of social life was much more successful:

"Russia cannot be understood by the mind, or measured by a common yardstick...."

There was the belief that the unity of Russian life was not a matter of rational organization, but a mystic sense of the singular and unique features of life in Russia, which had been divinely ordained to carry out a special mission. This current was called Russian messianism. In the official ideology the singularity of Russia was reinforced by the formula of "autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationality," and in various "alternative" ideologies emphasizing the uniqueness of Russia (beginning with the Slavophiles and ending with the "Union of the Archangel Michael") the most diverse values were assigned priority: social (the distinctive features of communal organization), religious (the Orthodox faith), cultural-historical (the distinctive features of the Slavic ethnic group), moral-ethical (the Russian soul, the Russian national character), geopolitical, and others. In all of these ideologies, however, Russia's place and role were exceptional from the very beginning. Russia was "objectively superior" by virtue of what might be termed its "Russianness," whatever its contributing factors might have been.

For the Russian pre-revolutionary bureaucracy this principle was personified by the sovereign, who was simultaneously the head of the Orthodox Church. The sovereign "organically" embodied the essence of national life. The political unity of the people took the form of what N.Ya. Danilevskiy termed "disciplined enthusiasm." All of this combined to make up the essence of Russian statism and the sacrosanct basis of the Russian governmental structure.

This principle collapsed along with the autocratic order. The principle of the democratic organization of the laboring masses prevailed. The soviets represented a concrete political form of this kind of organization. They were conceived spontaneously during the course of the revolutionary movement and realized the potential for democracy on an unparalleled mass basis of unprecedented dimensions.

By the end of the 1920's, however, the organic principle began to be revived, although this time it was dressed in different theoretical clothing—secularized—and, what is most important, it appeared in combination with the technocratic principle of rationality (we are not concerned here with the theoretically important question of the causes of its revival—this is a topic for further study). Different theoretical garb presupposed completely different terminology and the invocation of a different set of traditional beliefs and a different body of political experience. Nevertheless, the sacred essence was reflected in the assertion of the organic nature of the policy pursued, which would automatically, by virtue of its objective bases, guarantee its correspondence to the interests of all the classes, strata, groups, and individuals making up the society. This was a matter of the allegedly automatic superiority of socialism. Here is how the organic nature of successful development in agriculture was explained: "Giant grain factories cannot be established in the capitalist countries.... In those countries,

where the capitalists are, it is impossible to organize a large grain factory without buying several plots of land or paying an absolute amount of rent for the land, which certainly burdens production with colossal expenditures because the land there is owned by private individuals. In our country, on the other hand, there is no absolute rent for the land or the purchase and sale of plots of land, which *cannot fail to create* (emphasis mine—L.I.) favorable conditions for the development of large-scale grain farming, because our land is not privately owned. In the capitalist countries large grain farms are supposed to earn maximum profits.... In our country, on the other hand, ...farms...do not need maximum profits or an average profit norm for their development but can confine themselves to minimum profits, and sometimes no profits at all, and this also creates favorable conditions for the development of large-scale grain farming" [5, pp 438-439].

Because these advantages are objective and necessary (they "cannot fail to create favorable conditions..."), the technocratic administration based on their acknowledgment is doomed, so to speak, to succeed. It is a priori organic and gives rise to "disciplined enthusiasm" in the masses. "Even the blind can see that even if many peasants are seriously dissatisfied, they are not dissatisfied with the kolkhoz policy of the Soviet regime, but with the Soviet regime's inability to keep up with the growth of the kolkhoz movement" [5, p 439]. This was written in 1929 at the height of the collectivization campaigns. This was followed by a few hungry years when national agriculture was undermined to such a degree that only an entire series of extraordinary measures in the 1950's brought it back up to its 1928 level [6]. None of the mistakes committed at that time, even the ones with the most pernicious effects, could be criticized, however, because a policy resting on the sacred basis of objective advantages could not be revised. Even obvious political mistakes were credited to the greater glory of socialism, as in Stalin's famous article "Dizzy with Success."

Later this continuous sanctification gave forms and mechanisms of activity organic status and led to the outright idolization of Stalin. The sheen of "holiness" spread "from the top" to all levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy, as a result of which rational bureaucratic activity acquired sacred status. We still encounter this phenomenon today when, for example, an order from a raykom instructor is accepted by the low-level party organization as the voice of the party itself, even if the decision has not been made and approved democratically (by a raykom buro or plenum). The same thing happens in the soviet network and in different departments when bureaucrats validate their orders and instructions with the authority of the party and the Soviet Government.

The important thing, of course, is not that a specific measure or line might be erroneous or invalid. Neither people nor organizations are insured against error. What

is important is that the conservative outlook and the conservative syndrome are sanctifying technocratic authoritarianism. Sacred things cannot be criticized. Whole spheres of social life or, until recently, social life as a whole were removed from the realm of democratic discussion.

Sanctification had another side. Any resolute policy entails sacrifices. This is particularly true of a technocratic policy with little consideration for real facts. The policy of "dispossessing the kulaks" victimized many people. One of the victims was the peasant boy Pavlik Morozov, and the unavoidability of this sacrifice now arouses deep doubts. But this does not make a death, especially the death of a boy, any less tragic. Death is always sacred, and this natural feeling was extended to a policy with death as its ultimate result. The policy became sacred because it was a matter of life or death in the full sense of the term. This is why it is sometimes so difficult to reassess the results of this policy, which frequently seems sacrilegious and an insult to the memory of the victims.

All of this is clearly reflected in our current discussions of the results of collectivization and the prospects of our agrarian policy. The conservatism of the "organic" outlook is apparent in these discussions. One LITERATURNAYA GAZETA reader did not believe that the experience of socialist countries applied to our situation: "Our peasant was used to communal life and collectivism. It was in his blood. We had a need for broad-scale production activity. Production growth could be augmented by all the people, all the world" [7]. The echoes of the organic ideas of the Slavophiles and Stalin's justifications for collectivization can be heard in this opinion. And the specter of "disciplined enthusiasm" can be seen looming over all of this and is reflected in the appeals (cited on the same page in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA) to solve the food problem through the universal and voluntary limitation of consumption.

But let us return to our topic. Corresponding Member V.A. Tikhonov of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V.I. Lenin demonstrates that the ideal we called the organic principle is usually used to substantiate technocratic decisions. For example, the transition from Lenin's tax policy to the surplus-appropriation policy of the late 1920's was an arbitrary technocratic act. "This practice," V.A. Tikhonov writes, "required a theoretical basis. So some people immediately made the utopian views regarding commercial production in the socialist society their theoretical weapon. Scientific works were written to prove that commercial production and socialism were mutually exclusive" [7]. These theoretical beliefs were expressed in Stalin's remarks cited above. What is important to us now is not the political-economic content of these ideas, but their ideological import. Ideologically, this seemed to be the organic point of view, the idea of using the

unquestionable advantages of socialism. We now know what serious problems this combination of technocracy and the organic approach created.

When we speak of the conservative syndrome today, it seems obvious that we are striving to discover the features of the mechanism impeding and complicating our advancement. Some people might argue that it would have been difficult to call Stalin a conservative at that time; on the contrary, the old system of economic management was dismantled and new economic, political, and ideological attitudes were established. How can this be compared to the conservative syndrome?

Nevertheless, the conservative and the "revolutionary" can be comparable. This reminds us of a paradoxical idea once declared in the West, the idea of the "conservative revolution," of "creating something worth conserving." The organic ideal lies at the basis of this kind of "revolution" and presupposes sweeping technocratic reforms: the standardization of methods of activity, totalitarian control, the suppression of dissidents, to the point of their elimination, and the requirement of "disciplined enthusiasm" from all the rest. This kind of situation "cannot fail to create favorable conditions" for the display of "disciplined enthusiasm." Many of the economic and political undertakings of the late 1920's and early 1930's resemble attempts at this kind of conservative revolution: forcible collectivization, repression, and ideological dogmatism. One of the results of this "revolution" in the ideology, politics, and sociopsychological climate of our time is the tenacious and not easily refuted conservative syndrome. It takes many forms, but in essence it is a combination of technocratic (mechanically rational, undemocratic, and leaving no room for the consideration of the great diversity of human interests) methods of activity and a reverential, organic view of them.

We do not have to go far to find examples of this. IZVESTIYA published a letter from a reader, a shoemaker from Taganrog who had worked on his own for many years repairing shoes, had paid his license fees, and had nothing but satisfied customers [8]. Then the gorispolkom refused to renew his license because there was a manpower shortage in the shoe repair factory and advised the "private trader" to go to work for the state enterprise. The functionary from the gorispolkom displayed the two main components of the conservative syndrome: 1) the technocratic outlook of a person who was in a position of power and did not want to consider the opinions or desires of "cogs"; 2) the "reverent" view of the primacy of the socialist state's interests, extended in this case to the interests of the state shoe repair factory. We can assume that this functionary believes that the objective advantages of socialism "cannot fail to create favorable conditions" for the successful development of state-controlled shoe repair in Taganrog.

Situations like this one are many in number, but it is much more important to try to define some of the typical forms in which the conservative syndrome is displayed.

Here are some of the most obvious ones. The conservative syndrome is displayed in the authoritarian style of management; furthermore, the orders and prohibitions usually do not have a sufficiently rational basis but are reinforced either by tradition (and references to it might even be unconscious, taking the following form: "But how else would it be done?"), or by the "sacred" authority of certain concepts ("socialism," "the people," "the nation," "sacrifices," etc.), or (if the approach is rationalized) by theoretical principles portrayed as the only scientific, genuinely Marxist principles (for example, the idea of the mutual exclusivity of a commercial economy and socialism and the idea that Marxism is incompatible with the quantitative analysis—"cannot be measured by a common yardstick..."—of social processes, which supposedly leads to mechanistic and positivist trends).

This alone clearly shows that actions organized on the basis of the conservative syndrome are always portrayed as something for the benefit of society ("I am certainly not doing this for myself..."), for the common good. Sometimes this is their subjective purpose: The sincere bearer of the conservative syndrome might be ascetic in his own needs and way of life. More frequently, however, the illusion of unlimited possibilities for "reforming" activity, involving the issuance of orders and prohibitions to other people, reveals its other side—the unlimited possibilities for the satisfaction of one's own needs and requirements. This side is reinforced and consolidated through the "sanctification" of one's own person. The "bearer" of the syndrome who occupies an official position extends to himself the "objective sanctity" of the traditions or organization he represents and regards himself (this point of view is shared by other conservatives) as the embodiment of the sacred principle. But even in this case he might be sincerely striving for the common good, and his personal enrichment acquires a rational justification (in the belief that his work is so important and so highly responsible that he is entitled...). Lenin called this kind of person the "swaggering communist."

The authoritarian commanding style of the bearer of the syndrome inevitably degenerates into repressive practices, and the grounds for repression suddenly include not just actual failures or shortcomings in work, but also the non-conformist attitudes of the people around him. Repressive actions of various types are taken against those who cannot or will not share the reverential attitude toward something or someone. Eventually, the efforts to suppress dissenting views might even come into conflict with rational considerations. In this case, the consideration of the common good is preserved after being transformed into the idea of the beneficial effects of unanimity.

The syndrome is displayed in work with people, but it gives rise to the illusion of reforms in the objective physical world. This is the effect of the unique magical properties inherent in any sacrosanct entity. These reforms can actually be accomplished if the people

motivated by the orders and prohibitions are used more in their mass physical capacity (as cannon-fodder, labor armies, etc.) than as individuals. The application of gigantic volumes of elementary physical labor can lead to reforms in material circumstances, but the magic of the order or decree usually cannot change the objective environment of activity, and the conservative syndrome begins to reproduce itself, reflected only in the minds of the people who give and take the orders, engendering a sense of their own strength and greatness but not having any impact on the objective world. This widens the gap between the objective situation and its depiction in the mind of the bearer of the syndrome. This kind of self-deception, which is sometimes tragic, is the logical result of their general outlook and behavior.

The vicious circle of the conservative line of reasoning was broken by the words of truth announced from the rostrum of the 27th congress and the January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. A struggle against all forms of conservatism is now being waged throughout the country. The economic reform, which is being carried out in accordance with the principles formulated at the June (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and reflected in several legislative undertakings, is extremely important in this context. The economic perestroika is of tremendous ideological significance. It must eliminate the many mirages and hallucinations engendered by the conservative syndrome and bring thinking in line with reality by putting it on a factual basis. The nutritive medium for irresponsible sensationalism and dogmatic obstinacy, for ideological hysterics and moral nihilism, for impossible dreams and sinister paranoid fantasies, will soon disappear. But reliance on the automatic influence of economic and organizational factors is naive and inconsistent. What we need is a psychological perestroika, and this promises to be a long and difficult process, because getting rid of the conservative syndrome will ultimately be a matter of the mind and will of each specific individual.

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Interview with Corresponding Member of USSR Academy of Sciences M.N. Rutkevich
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[Interview with Corresponding Member of USSR Academy of Sciences Mikhail Nikolayevich Rutkevich; first paragraph is SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA introduction]

[Text] This year Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences M.N. Rutkevich, the renowned sociologist, will celebrate his 70th birthday. A journal correspondent met with him and asked him to answer the editors' questions.

[Correspondent] Mikhail Nikolayevich, there are hundreds of books and articles in the catalog of your scientific works. Most of them are sociological studies. But you started your career as a specialist in dialectical materialism. What motivated you to take an interest in sociology at the same time, especially in the years when it was necessary to literally fight for its right to exist as one of the Marxist social sciences? This could not have been easy.

[M.N. Rutkevich] Dialectical materialism and Marxist sociology are not separated by a "Great Wall of China." The unity and integrity of Marxist theory presupposed the close connection and interaction of its elements. Historical materialism, as a dialectical-materialistic explanation of the historical process, is simultaneously a social philosophy and the general theoretical sociology of Marxism, which lies at the basis of all other sociological theories (of course, I am referring only to Marxist sociology) and of empirical sociological research.

In the social atmosphere following the 20th party congress in our country, the need for sociology and for concrete sociological research began to be felt as an inner need by all Marxist scientists who were not content with the repetition of a specific number of established facts. The desire to understand all of the complexity and contradictions of social life in our country, the desire for the "self-knowledge of socialism," caused many philosophers, economists, jurists, and social psychologists to become sociologists in those years. And the road to sociology from philosophy is certainly no longer than the road from political economy. But dialectical materialism was always my "home base" and it still is. I published my monograph "Current Aspects of Lenin's Theory of Reflection" in 1970, "Dialectical Materialism. A Lecture Course for Philosophy Departments" (which are still

using this book) in 1973, and "Dialectics and Sociology" in 1980. In general, I am convinced that there is room within the Marxist framework for the narrow specialist and researchers working in several fields.

In the Urals (along with Moscow, Leningrad, and Novosibirsk), some precocious young scientists formed a group in the late 1950's and early 1960's to actively defend sociology's existence. Some studies were conducted in Sverdlovsk in such fields as changes in the social structure of society and the social role of the educational system (especially after the educational reform of 1958, which turned out to be a failure, was repealed, but in such a way that schools returned to the "gymnasium" model in the middle of the 1960's), and in the second half of the 1960's the planning of the social development of labor collectives and of cities and other territorial units was studied. In 1965, when a school of philosophy was opened at the Urals State University, sociological personnel began to be trained. My position as dean was not an easy one, because specialization in applied sociology was not officially authorized for the next 20 years, and even then only at Moscow and Leningrad state universities.

[Correspondent] Today sociological research is constantly being expanded. Sociologists are expected to perform great things in their capacity as the "supervisors of perestroyka." But the party teaches us to view our accomplishments with objectivity and discernment. Are any factors now impeding the development of sociology? Where is underdevelopment apparent?

[M.N. Rutkevich] The month of April 1985 had several features in common with the spring of 1956. But the scales and significance of the essentially revolutionary renewal of society which began 2 years ago are incomparably greater. And the role of sociology, which has again experienced strong momentum in its development, is different. First of all, because the party leadership has repeatedly requested representatives of the science of sociology to take an active part in the perestroyka. Second, because in 1956 sociology had to be revived, following its rapid growth in the 1920's and subsequent collapse at the beginning of the 1930's, but now, in spite of its shortcomings and gaps, Soviet sociology has the necessary traditions, personnel, and its own press organ—SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA. In the 13 years of its existence the journal has played an extremely important role in consolidating and educating the army of sociologists, including those working at enterprises, in public opinion research centers, in cultural establishments, and so forth, taking a direct part in administrative decisionmaking at various levels. Therefore, there is every reason to anticipate a new surge in the development of Soviet sociology, the elevation of its status in society, and the augmentation of its contribution to the perestroyka within the near future.

There are some factors impeding this process, however. I would divide them into external factors, outside sociology, and internal factors.

As far as external factors are concerned, the development of sociology is being impeded by the state of statistics in general and of social statistics in particular. The report on the expansion of USSR Central Statistical Administration publications aroused interest. Just recently the administration published information about agricultural produce sales and prices in urban markets; infant mortality and average life expectancy (these statistics were frozen in 1977); the patterns of worker and employee diversion from their main jobs, etc. Of course, this is only the beginning.

There are several fields (for example, the individual labor in the "shadow economy") which are bypassed or seemingly overlooked by statistical agencies, although informed economists estimate that the income of the private consumer service sphere is comparable to the turnover of state consumer service enterprises. This kind of economic activity is the main or supplementary occupation of millions of people, and this should therefore be reflected in descriptions of the social structure of society. Incidentally, the majority of people engaged in unregistered individual activity are in no hurry to apply to local administrative bodies for permits or to pay for licenses.

Even the most superficial comparison with statistical reference works published in Hungary, Poland, and several other socialist countries in Europe clearly shows how much easier it is for sociologists in those countries to do their work. Our sociological studies often try to fill in the gaps in statistics or are confined to a more or less qualified analysis of statistical data and the "derivation" of those of their implications that are concealed from the uninitiated.

Sociology should not be a substitute for statistics, however; it should take statistics as a point of departure and then go further, revealing what statistics cannot tell us. Statistics cannot completely reveal the dialectical interaction of various phenomena or the qualitative features of the spheres of social life that are recorded with the aid of quantitative indicators. For example, statistics alone cannot serve as a basis for an understanding of the social-class structure of society. This also requires a theory revealing deep-seated relations and the laws of social life, both the general laws and the laws peculiar to a particular structure. Furthermore, statistics are based on objective indicators of the results of activity, whereas sociology must also reveal the factors motivating human activity (or inactivity) and reveal the individual's assessment of events through the prism of his own interests. In other words, Marxist sociology—in complete accordance with its theoretical basis—must explain not the state of social existence and social consciousness, but relate motives, opinions, and judgments—that is, the subjective side of the matter—to the objective interests of individuals, families, groups, and classes and to the social status determining these interests. And if Soviet sociology does not want to repeat the mistakes of many

Western scientists who employ the indicator of "satisfaction with life" regardless of what life is like for different social strata, it must see subjective opinions as a reflection (even if only a partial, indistinct, and sometimes distorted reflection) of objective reality.

The second external difficulty is the inadequate emphasis on sociological practice, on the requirements of life, which stems from a lack of taste and interest and from the need to apply for sociological assistance on various "floors" and in various "compartments" of the administrative edifice. Sometimes the people endowed with administrative powers are simply afraid to ask for sociological assistance or to let scientists examine the existing state of affairs. In the last 2 years the situation has been changing gradually. The clearly stated recommendations of party and state leaders and the replacement of the perestroika's opponents with its active supporters are having an impact here as well. But attitudes are still varied. The Center for the Study, Guidance, and Forecasting of Public Opinion of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia is working successfully, but for a long time it was a solitary beacon, and even now the center's methods are not being used on a broad scale by others. Some enterprises in the Urals have had a sociological service for around 20 years, with many useful research projects to its credit. For example, the group guarantee of the observance of discipline at the Seversk Pipe Plant, which has won the support of the CPSU Central Committee, was studied and summarized by sociologists in the Urals back in the late 1960's. But at how many enterprises do self-funding brigades and group guarantees exist only in reports, only to make a good impression?

Two of the internal causes warrant special discussion. The first is the shortage of comparatively well-trained personnel. Quite frankly, there is nothing surprising about this. I remember a meeting of the collegium of the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education on 9 January 1974. I was invited to attend the meeting and discuss some proposals, approved by the Philosophy and Law Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, concerning the expansion of sociological education in the country. Then USSR Minister of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education V.P. Yelyutin turned out to be a resolute opponent of innovations. The discussion turned into a heated argument, but the people in power won the fight. The half-hearted measures which were taken 10 years later have not solved the problem. We should begin by establishing sociology departments in the country's leading universities and by legalizing not only "applied sociology" but also just plain sociology, in which theory is indivisible from its applied aspects. We are 10 years behind the world's leading countries in higher sociological education. This gap must be steadily reduced.

The second is the poor philosophical and professional background of personnel. It is clearly reflected in the initial theoretical premises of studies and in research

methods and it naturally affects research findings. For example, the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences recently surveyed voters in multimandate electoral districts. The survey indicated that 60 percent of the voters were in favor of innovations, 30 percent were undecided, and 10 percent were against them. When an institute representative reported the findings to the bureau of the Philosophy and Law Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, he was asked some questions: "What were the reasons for disapproval?" (After all, some people disapprove, so to speak, "from the left" while others disapprove "from the right.") "What was the percentage of disapproval in different strata of the population?" "How was the sample group formed and how representative was it?" Unfortunately, these questions remained unanswered. If this study had been conducted, so to speak, by the rules, it would have provided extremely valuable information for administrative decisionmaking, for the successful introduction of innovations, and for the improvement of the electoral system.

I will take another example from a field in which I have some experience—the social-class structure of society. Books and articles are still being published in which the structure of society is confined to its social composition, without any consideration for the diverging interests of social groups or examinations of conflicts between them. Furthermore, the social composition itself is oversimplified, without any consideration for intra-class structural features or the fact that the main social groups consist of strata and segments whose differences can frequently be more perceptible than inter-class differences and whose status can vary widely. The strong connection between these strata and segments and the professional structure is not considered either. Discussions of tendencies in the development of the social structure focus only on the integrative processes strengthening the unity of society, whereas in reality, especially in connection with the ongoing perestroika, processes of differentiation are growing more pronounced. Mixed groups (for example, people employed in the national economy and in personal work) are not taken into account, and neither are border groups, the strata representing social pathology, etc. This kind of dogmatic approach, which took shape over decades and which was opposed by many (including me) even earlier, still prevails, especially in literature on the theory of scientific communism. They cannot see the forest for the trees.

On the other hand, there is a peculiar reaction to this dogmatism in some articles by extremely respected scientists who cannot see the trees for the forest, obscuring the general with the particular, and sometimes even questioning the validity of the class approach in general, especially the existence of the three main friendly social forces and their gradual convergence under the guidance of the working class, because, as they say, we have dozens or even hundreds of different socioprofessional groups with their own interests. Theories of social stratification gave people something to think about during the periods

before and during crises in some socialist countries (P. Machonin, "Sozialni structura socialisticke spolecnosti," Prague, 1966; W. Wesolowski, "Klasy, warstwy i wladza," Warsaw, 1977). Attempts to apply them to our situation were unfounded. The Marxist-Leninist theory of classes provides the key to an understanding of the development of not only the contemporary bourgeois society, but also the contemporary socialist society.

It seems to me that surmounting these external and internal causes of underdevelopment would allow Soviet sociology to take its rightful place, within the next few years, in the reorganization of all facets of social life and the transition of the Soviet socialist society to a new qualitative state.

[Correspondent] The last question is a traditional one. What are you working on now?

[M.N. Rutkevich] I am finishing my work (in conjunction with Professor L.Ya. Rubina) on a book "Obshchestvennyye potrebnosti, sistema obrazovaniya, plany molodezhi" [Social Needs, the Educational System, and the Plans of Youth], which should be published by Politizdat in 1988. We are concerned about the conflicts between these three factors and the ways of resolving them under present conditions. The book is a continuation of research begun a quarter of a century ago and reflected in the monographs "The Career Plans of Youth and Their Realization" (1966) and "Social Mobility" (written with F.R. Filippov, 1970). I must say quite frankly that I am not surprised that the 1984 educational reform has "hit the skids." Many of the fundamental suggestions made by the participants in the nationwide discussion (including my own) were not taken into account. I am convinced that the last 2 years of secondary school cannot and should not prepare people for the VUZ and simultaneously train them in a worker profession. As for the reorganization of higher and secondary specialized education, the corresponding documents were compiled in the post-April period and are therefore more thoroughly considered. But many problems in the augmentation of the intellectual potential of our country seem to still be unresolved. Of course, there is no point in discussing the contents of this book in any greater detail now, because the reader will be able to form his own opinion of the book in the near future.

My plans for the more distant future are difficult to judge because they will depend not only on me, but also on the willingness of central publishing houses to accept various proposals. The publishing houses are in the process of reorganization, but the procedure for submitting books is still a complicated one, and it still takes a manuscript several years to become a book. But I am an optimist and I expect the new leadership of the State Committee of the USSR for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade to shorten this "incubation period."

[Correspondent] Mikhail Nikolayevich, thank you for this talk. On behalf of the editors of the journal of which you have been a member of the editorial board and a permanent contributing author since the day it was founded, I want to congratulate you on your birthday and wish you health and continued success in your work.

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Changes in Social-Class Structure of Soviet Society Under Conditions of Perestroyka

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[Text] The fundamental reform of the economic mechanism for the complete use of commodity and money relations and the democratization of the administrative system is causing profound changes in the entire social structure of society. Today we can only discuss the first signs of certain tendencies. It is obviously wrong to oversimplify the social structure of society by confining it to the social composition of the population. It actually represents a system of interacting subjects—classes, social groups and strata, sociodemographic groups and territorial communities, sectorial segments and the labor collectives making them up, and, finally, individual citizens (these final "bricks" or elements of all facets of the social structure), with their diverging or conflicting interests that must be reconciled.¹

At the June (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum M.S. Gorbachev said that "the experience in perestroyka, its initial phase, motivates us to also take a careful look at the existing conflicting interests of various population groups, collectives, departments, and organizations" [8, p 1].

The social-class structure plays the most significant role in the system of social relations, even under socialism. A onesided approach to this matter is often found in our literature. On the one hand, there are tenacious dogmatic and oversimplified ideas, confining the social-class structure to the social composition of the population, and the latter to the three main social groups in society:

the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry, and the intelligentsia. The increasingly complex internal structure of each of these groups, the presence of different strata and segments within each of these groups, the birth and growth of border strata, the existence of population categories not fitting into these basic divisions, and other considerations are not taken into account. Furthermore, something of particular importance under the conditions of perestroyka is not being taken into account: the connection between the social-class structure and the socioprofessional structure, the sociodemographic structure, the structure of employment by sectors and labor collectives, etc. And perhaps the most important thing is that the relations between elements of this structure are given a onesided interpretation, in terms of only friendship and cooperation, without any consideration for diverging and conflicting interests, and developmental trends are given an equally onesided interpretation as only the growth of social integration, excluding processes of social differentiation.

On the other hand, apparently as a reaction to dogmatism, "super-radical" voices can sometimes be heard denying the class divisions of society and replacing them with a theory of stratification (in terms of income, prestige, influence, etc.). Both of these tendencies seem wrong to us because they come into conflict with reality.

By accelerating economic development, perestroyka is creating the necessary conditions for the acceleration of social development in general. The main slogan of perestroyka is: "More socialism will produce more democracy." As this slogan becomes a reality, the move toward social homogeneity will become more pronounced.

We must remember, however, that a long period of stagnation put the national economy in a pre-crisis state before the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. It is completely understandable that this state had the most direct effect on social relations, the moral climate, and all aspects of social life.

During the process of perestroyka, the primarily authoritarian methods of administration by means of voluntarist decisions, such as, for example, the decision to do away with still effective cooperative and individual forms of labor organization and the patterns of ownership related to them, the authoritarian methods which took shape over decades and became the prevailing form of administration, can and should be surmounted gradually. The deformities of socialism which took shape over that time should also be eliminated: the spread of non-labor income, the excessive growth of the "shadow" economy, wage-leveling, the constant growth of the administrative sphere and the assumption of unjustified privileges by some categories of personnel in this sphere, etc. All of these phenomena are not simply economic, but are simultaneously social as well. At the end of the last century V.I. Lenin asked: "How can the economic exist outside the social?" [1]. It is not surprising that the social structures Marx defined are called *socioeconomic*,

underscoring the fact that all economic relations have their social side—i.e., are reflected in the division of society into classes and other social groups with their own special interests.

This also applies completely to the lengthy stage of the historical development of a society making the transition, after a socialist revolution, from the class-antagonistic structure characteristic of capitalism to the complete elimination of classes in the second phase of the communist society.

We believe that Lenin's definition of classes in 1919 [2] is still completely applicable to the socialist society and that it is of decisive methodological significance in an understanding of the evolution of the socialist society's social-class structure, including the stage of the radical and qualitative perestroika of social relations, the stage the Soviet society has now entered. The occasional attempts to deny the significance of this definition on the pretext that V.I. Lenin was referring only to the exploitative society do not, in our opinion, stand up to criticism. We must not forget that this definition is of a general nature and, what is more, was formulated after the revolution, during the period of transition. The attempts to "decompose" or, to put it simply, to revise this definition and, consequently, the Marxist-Leninist theory of classes and the transition to a classless society were undertaken for good reasons during periods of crisis (or during pre-crisis periods) in the development of some socialist countries by sociologists adhering to the bourgeois theory of social stratification [11].

The general definition of class differences based on the position occupied by the classes in a historically determined system of social production was made more specific by V.I. Lenin in relation to the three main elements of the system of production relations and the connection between these differences and conflicts.² On the basis of this approach, we will attempt to analyze already apparent and projected changes in the social-class structure of our society during the stage of perestroika.

The most important criterion of social-class differences is the relationship of classes, social groups, the segments and strata making them up, and the basic social nuclei of the socialist society—labor collectives, uniting members of different social groups—to the means of production.

The Law on the State Enterprise (or Association) [9], which was passed by a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and then approved after nationwide discussion by the June (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, envisages a transition to full economic accountability, self-funding, heightened economic autonomy, the involvement of all laborers in management, and the payment of wages according to the final results of labor in accordance with customer-acknowledged, and therefore socially acknowledged, product quality and quantity. This means that the labor collective's right to own,

manage, and use the means of production placed at its disposal by the society has been changed radically: It is becoming the master of production. Various forms of contracts, such as the collective or brigade contract with payment for final results, are being employed on a broader scale in industry, construction, transportation, etc.

Under these conditions the convergence of the working class, especially its agrarian segment, with the kolkhoz peasantry is acquiring new features. Integration processes within the agroindustrial complex, the increasing division of labor, and inter-farm cooperatives are essentially putting the labor collectives of sovkhozes and kolkhozes in an equal position in the agroindustrial system. This is reflected in supplies of technical equipment and other means of production and in their repair; in the zonal differentiation of payments for products turned over to the state, with appreciable surcharges for economically weak kolkhozes and sovkhozes; in the crediting of both types of farms by Gosbank on equal terms; in the establishment of the quantities of obligatory deliveries of products to the state and the right to sell part of the product on the kolkhoz market, etc. On the other hand, the transfer to full economic accountability, the introduction of the labor contract (in agriculture, there are also the link and family contracts), and the democratization of the management of state enterprises, including sovkhozes, mean that they will acquire some of the forms of management (the election of directors, division chiefs, and brigade leaders, payment according to the final result of farm activity with a view to the contribution of each individual, etc.) which were initially characteristic of kolkhozes but were later almost nullified by the pressure tactics of rayon organs and superior agencies. Now these forms of management will be instituted on sovkhozes and simultaneously revived and reinforced on kolkhozes.

It is significant that the convergence of the kolkhoz peasantry with the agrarian segment of the working class, the group closest to it in terms of socioeconomic conditions, has been accompanied by the convergence of these two with the industrial nucleus of the working class—a gradual process resulting from the use of the latest technical equipment in agricultural production, the introduction of modern forms of labor organization in the fields and in animal husbandry facilities, and the equalization of wages in agriculture and industry.

The social aspects of current economic developments, which have been revived by the perestroika but were once artificially curtailed or were driven into the "shadow" economy, where they were not reflected in official statistics, demand special attention. The development of crafts cooperatives stopped in 1959, when 2 million members of artels were "transferred" to the category of workers and employees in local industry. Producers' cooperatives continued to exist on a very small scale (fishing kolkhozes, gold prospecting artels, etc.).

As for individual labor activity, it was not prohibited and was even sanctioned by the 1977 Constitution of the USSR [7]. But in its legal forms, registered with local soviets and financial agencies, it remained so negligible that the reference publications of the USSR Central Statistical Administration after 1965 invariably indicated that 0.0 percent of the population was engaged in this kind of work. Craftsmen engaged in shoe repair, tailoring, and so forth, private tutors, and physicians with a private practice did not disappear, but in the overwhelming majority of cases individual labor activity (ILA) stayed in the background.

In accordance with the decisions of the 27th party congress, cooperatives and people engaged in ILA officially began operating on 1 May 1987, primarily in such fields as the use of recycled resources for the production of consumer goods, and especially in the service sphere. The economic expediency of these measures is indisputable at a time when the shortage of goods and services in relation to effective consumer demand has reached 16-18 billion rubles a year [13]. The development of the new cooperatives and ILA will cover at least part of this demand and contribute to the fuller use of labor resources (and in some parts of the country, such as Central Asia, these resources are quite substantial), the improvement of supplies of consumer goods, and the fuller satisfaction of the public demand for the most diverse services: the construction of private homes and vacation homes, household and appliance repairs, passenger transport, and public catering. Unfortunately, in many cases the establishment of these cooperatives has been impeded by bureaucratic obstacles. By the middle of June 1987 only a few thousand people in Moscow had expressed a wish to engage in ILA and to apply for permits or licenses, although hundreds of thousands of people are actually engaged in this kind of work. According to TsSU data, there were more than 3,000 cooperatives in the country by 1 July 1987 [25].

It is not our intention to present a detailed discussion of the economic significance of the new cooperatives and ILA, especially since they are just taking their first steps and have not established permanent relationships with state enterprises and local government agencies. For our purposes, it is important to note that the development of these economic forms of ownership is making definite changes in the social structure of the Soviet society. First of all, we can already predict the growth of the stratum of people earning supplementary income (in their time away from their jobs at state enterprises and organizations) from labor in cooperatives and legalized individual labor within the social groups of workers, employees, and specialists. The labor of this stratum is based primarily on public ownership, and partly on group (in the cooperatives) and private ownership (simple tools of labor, motor vehicles, etc.) of the means of production. This stratum also includes many retired individuals who will be paid a pension for work in the past (in the public sector or on a kolkhoz) and will simultaneously earn income, comparable in size to the pension, from work on

a cooperative or private subsidiary farm. It is particularly significant that the stratum of people combining ILA with work in public farming (in the present or the past) actually numbers in the millions (18 million, according to some estimates). Measures promoting the development of cooperatives and ILA are intended not only to include previously unemployed citizens in these forms of labor, but also and primarily to redirect ILA from the "shadow" economy into legal channels.

In the second place, we can assume that the almost extinct stratum of small individual producers (in cottage industry and the crafts, and possibly petty merchants renting trade area on the basis of a family contract) who are not engaged in state (or kolkhoz) farming will be revived on a limited scale. In Uzbekistan, for example, licenses and permits for certain types of ILA are being issued to adults not employed in the public sector. Some Soviet philosophers, sociologists, and economists are experiencing a superstitious fear of the revival of this virtually extinct stratum. In our opinion, there are no solid grounds for this fear. In several socialist countries in Europe, where the construction of a developed socialist society is being pursued successfully (for example, in Hungary and the GDR), the stratum of craftsmen, private producers, and petty merchants represented 4.4 percent and around 3 percent respectively of the working-age population in 1985 [14]. The expediency of their existence has been acknowledged, because the activities of this stratum are overseen by state agencies, are subject to taxation and, what is most important, are helping to satisfy the demand for services and many consumer goods. In the USSR, if we count the unregistered (and therefore untaxed) "left" activity of people not employed in the public sector, the stratum of individual producers has actually existed all of these years and exists today. Under the conditions of the perestroika it should be legalized along with the stratum of people partially engaged in ILA and in cooperative labor, and the income derived from this work should be subject to a differentiated tax, which, on the one hand, would stimulate ILA and, on the other, would put a reasonable limit on the income derived from it. It seems to us that the issuance of a license (or a registration certificate) for ILA to those citizens (or families) who are not employed in the public sector should be the primary objective, because it is precisely in these cases that ILA frequently turns into a source of non-labor income.

The large group of citizens (35 million families) earning part of their income from labor on a private subsidiary farm (PSF) using publicly owned means of production (land, tractors borrowed from kolkhozes and sovkhoses, etc.) and the private property of citizens (outbuildings, livestock, and simple tools of labor) are in a somewhat special position in relation to the means of production. This group includes almost all of the kolkhoz peasantry (the average kolkhoz family derived 24.1 percent of its total income from a PSF in 1985) [15, p 419], sovkhos workers, workers employed in other sectors, and employees and specialists living in rural communities, in worker settlements, or on the outskirts of cities.

As a result of the all-round assistance of kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and local soviets, the PSF is turning into a "subsidiary shop" of the public farming sector. The attempts of the 1970's and early 1980's to halt the tendency toward the reduction of agricultural products from the PSF were inadequate. Between 1981 and 1986 the number of cows stayed at 13.2 million, the number of hogs decreased from 14 million to 13.9 million, and the number of sheep rose from 25.6 million to 28 million [16, p 236; 15, p 245]. Additional measures have been taken during the perestroika phase to promote an increase in the number of privately owned livestock.

At the same time, it is impossible to ignore the facts indicating that the owners of some PSF's are concentrating not on the satisfaction of their families' needs for additional food and on the sale of surplus products to the state, to consumer cooperatives, and to other citizens in the marketplace, but on the cultivation of a single crop whose marketing holds out the promise of a huge income, incommensurate with the labor expended. For example, the press has reported that many PSF's in some communities in the country have turned into commercial seed-breeding centers (David-Gorodok in Belorussia), hothouse farming centers (Kuybyshevskiy Rayon, Krasnodar Kray), and so forth. In addition, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that small-scale production conducted on state-owned land for a symbolic rental payment has become the main source of income of part of the families in resort areas and in communities near big cities. Private ownership of a dwelling is also turning into a source of substantial income in some cases (and this also applies sometimes to the use of state-owned housing).

Labor on PSF's, especially those where the owners do not keep livestock, has many features in common with the individual labor of urban workers and employees in gardening and produce cooperatives. Today there are around 12 million such farms, but their number was artificially limited for a long time and did not begin rising rapidly until after the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. The satisfaction of the demand for them as quickly as possible has been assigned priority, in spite of bureaucratic talk about the shortage of land for these purposes. Directive bodies have passed resolutions in support of the initiative of several local soviets which have authorized citizens to buy uninhabited homes needing major repairs in rural areas with the right to rent a plot of land of approximately the same size as the plots in gardening cooperatives (this has been practiced successfully for a long time in Bulgaria). Vigorous measures are now being taken to expand the production and sale of garden sheds, gardening tools, seeds, fertilizer, and seedlings and to organize the efficient purchase and sale of the surplus products of cooperatives, which is a practice of long standing in the GDR. The additional labor performed by workers and employees on the land will have a positive impact as far as ecology and sanitation are concerned and will be a factor in the convergence of much of the urban population with kolkhoz members

and other rural inhabitants in terms of their "mixed" relationship to the means of production. The basic social status determined by social position in the public sector will be supplemented by the family's work on a small plot of state-owned land, the ownership of simple means of production, and the derivation of part of the family income from additional (family) labor.

The most important criterion of the social differences pointed out by V.I. Lenin is the person's role in the social organization of labor or, in other words, his place in social division of labor, determined by the nature of his labor. Perestroika is introducing several changes into this sphere. Above all, the fundamental perestroika of production relations, a truly revolutionary change, is intended to replace the "brakes" with an "accelerator" of the growth of productive forces and give this growth new qualitative features through the radical modernization of the technical base of production with the latest scientific and technical achievements (already existing ones and ones that will make their appearance in the near future). The comprehensive mechanization and automation of production processes and the extensive incorporation of computers, microprocessors, modules, and flexible production systems represent the focal point of production renewal. This will take time. This is why the need for the maximum use of economic-organizational and *social* reserves, securing the growth of labor productivity and the conservation of material and human resources, was already being pointed out at the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum [5]. The use of these reserves will produce, as indicated by the experience of the initial stage of the perestroika, a great impact right away, before the introduction of considerable changes in equipment and technology becomes possible. In particular, job performance evaluations and the efficient use of personnel will reduce the number of production personnel substantially, particularly the number of unskilled and semiskilled workers. For example, the number of people employed on the Belorussian railroad alone will be reduced by more than 10,000.

The transfer to full economic accountability and to the self-funding of enterprises and the reduction of managerial staffs will correct the largely artificial shortage of manpower and free personnel on a much broader scale. This will establish the necessary conditions for the manning of several non-production sectors—the service sphere, public health, recreation, etc. "This regrouping of manpower," M.S. Gorbachev said at the June (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "will require constant attention and carefully planned organizational measures" [8, p 5]. Even now, in some cities where job applicants must be recommended by the job placement bureau, these bureaus are successfully performing the functions of manpower redistribution, reducing the amount of time lost during moves from one enterprise (or establishment) to another, and helping to reduce personnel turnover. In the new situation created after the adoption of documents on the fundamental perestroika of economic management, the state agencies concerned

with labor and social problems will have broader rights and more responsibility. The opinions of some economists regarding the practical value of a "small reserve army of labor" [17] seem dubious to us. The social guarantees securing the right of Soviet citizens to work will be observed. The marginal social stratum of unemployed individuals will not exist in the USSR during the current stage in its development.

The control figures approved at the 27th CPSU Congress for the year 2000 presuppose a reduction of 15-20 percent in the relative amount of manual labor in the production sphere and a substantial increase in the relative number of workers engaged in mechanized and automated labor [6]. These processes are now beginning, however slowly, to affect the spheres of management and services. The experience of some developed countries testifies that the incorporation of computers changes the nature and content of the labor of trade, sales, supply, and administrative personnel and considerably reduces the number of personnel by eliminating unskilled and semiskilled jobs.

From the social standpoint these changes will mean: a) further changes in the "stratified" structure of the working class and kolkhoz peasantry—a rise in the average level of labor skills will be accompanied by a higher percentage of highly skilled workers and a lower percentage of workers in the lowest skill category; b) the gradual reduction of the stratum of non-specialist employees and their replacement with specialists; c) the growth of the border stratum of worker-intellectuals, who now represent, as researchers have repeatedly pointed out, the "upper" stratum of the working class in terms of skills. It is particularly important to remember that the "thickness" of this stratum must not be measured "mathematically." The perestroika of the economic mechanism, the introduction of cost accounting, and the transfer to contract relations between enterprises and the VUZ's training specialists for them should put an end to the wasteful and senseless employment of engineers and technicians in jobs where their education turns out to be unemployed capital.

All of these changes are moving in a single direction: They are accelerating the convergence of workers engaged in physical and mental labor. The first is being endowed with more and more *intellectual* content, and the second is being *technologized*—i.e., is entailing the increasing use of technical equipment, especially computers, in all forms of intellectual labor, including creative fields.

Another important goal of the perestroika in the social organization of labor is the reduction of the excessively large (up to 18 million people) administrative sphere. As we know, the people employed in this sphere belong to different social categories: the stratum of managers—i.e., the people who are engaged directly in organizational work and who make administrative decisions; the stratum of specialist-executives, who make all of the

preparations for decisions and oversee their fulfillment; the stratum of workers and employees performing the necessary auxiliary functions connected with communications, the distribution of materials, clerical work, building maintenance, etc.

The democratization of management following the January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum signified the mass inclusion of laborers in administrative decisionmaking through enterprise councils in accordance with the Law on the State Enterprise (or Association) [9]. The councils of brigade leaders, general meetings, elections of managers, and the activities of trade unions and other social organizations in labor collectives are working toward the same end. The economic basis of the democratization of production management consists in a transfer to self-funding and the distribution of enterprise income in accordance with the labor contribution of each worker. The restructuring of economic relations will serve as the basis for expanded self-management and, conversely, the development of self-management and the inclusion of workers in decisionmaking represent the most important part of economic restructuring.

The stratum of organizers of production in the economy and all public life, in which administrative functions will be concentrated, will consist mainly of elected managers. Progress in this area can be judged by the Ukrainian experience: As of March 1987, 462 managers of enterprises in industry, construction, transportation, and communication and sovkhos directors and more than 25,000 shop chiefs had been elected in the republic [18]. Brigade leaders are elected everywhere, and at some enterprises and associations, such as the Kaluga Turbine Plant, councils of brigade leaders, endowed with sweeping powers and acting under the jurisdiction of association directors, have existed for many years.

The principle of election is also being used on a broader scale outside the production sphere. The first experiment has already been conducted in elections of VUZ rectors (Perm State University imeni A.M. Gorkiy) [19]. Elected bodies are playing a more important role in creative organizations, restricting the possibilities for administrative interference in the creative process in work on movies, plays, books, the fine arts, and architecture. Each rung of the administrative ladder and each different field of activity should have its own election procedure.

It is extremely important to consider the *specific nature* of any sphere of activity. For example, we could hardly agree with the proposal that directors of scientific research institutes be elected at a general meeting of the labor collective [20]. The director of a scientific establishment should be a scientist with organizational skills and with the ability to direct creative efforts for the achievement of new results corresponding to the present level of world science or surpassing it. It is hardly likely that laboratory assistants, janitors, or even researchers who are just beginning their scientific career could

evaluate these qualities. We should learn something from the experience of the many scientific research institutes which are successfully devouring public resources without giving anything back in return and which are headed by directors who make the collective feel "comfortable." The appointment of directors of sectorial research institutes by ministries is not always the best practice either. An election procedure in which the suitability of directorial candidates in academy institutes is judged by a competent board of scientists of equal or higher rank is more in the spirit of genuine democracy (rather than a show of democracy), although even this procedure is not always successful.

There is no question that the principle of election must not rescind the absolute authority of the manager responsible for the decisions made by the collective or party guidance in personnel hiring and placement. The possibility of removing inefficient managers, the stronger control of their work, periodic reports by managers to labor collectives and to the population, and the increasing participation of the masses in administration will signify an important step in surmounting the differences between mental organizational work and the actual performance of work (physical and mental), and this is one of the oldest and most pronounced social differences.

The most important signs of social-class differences pointed out by V.I. Lenin are relative income and the method of earning income [2]. The elimination of the firmly entrenched violations of the principle of distribution according to labor in the socialist society has been assigned priority in the perestroyka. Let us take a brief look at some of the main tendencies in this process: a) the elimination of wage-leveling among labor collectives and the establishment of a direct connection between the enterprise wage fund and the socially acknowledged consumer value of the product; b) the elimination of wage-leveling among subdivisions and workers within enterprises through the introduction of real cost accounting relations between them (for example, the system of checks on kolkhozes and sovkhozes) and the establishment of salary size with a view to the skills and personal labor contribution of each worker; c) the incorporation of a new wage system in branches of physical production to augment the percentage of the wage represented by the skill differential and "stretch" the differences in salary rates for workers from 1.56:1 (between categories VI and I) to 1.8:1, and even to 2:1 in some cases; d) a rise in the salaries of specialists—i.e., people engaged in skilled mental labor—with the aim of gradually surmounting the consequences of the lengthy period when their salaries were lagging behind and when the salaries of engineering and technical personnel and other categories of specialists were almost equal to the average wage of workers (in construction the correlation was 98:100 in 1985) [15, p. 418]; e) the elimination of non-labor income. All of these processes will be accompanied by the general enhancement of public well-being and a 1.6-fold to 1.8-fold increase in real per capita income by the year 2000 [6].

From the social standpoint these processes will intensify differences in labor income in accordance with the quality, quantity, and conditions of labor, which is consistent with the principles of socialism and will eliminate differences conflicting with these principles. Social differences corresponding to the principles of socialist justice will provide stronger incentives for labor, accelerate the growth of labor productivity, promote production growth and, consequently, the further enhancement of public well-being, and create the necessary conditions for more pronounced tendencies toward social integration.

Public consumption funds (PCF's) have a special role to play in the development of social relations in the socialist society. These funds already secure up to one-third of the income of laborers' families. They perform a definite equalizing role in the social sphere because they guarantee the satisfaction of the most important needs, which are usually called social, either for free or on preferential terms. Until the end of the 20th century the PCF's will continue to grow more quickly than income from labor, as they have throughout the postwar decades (they will approximately double by the year 2000) [6]. Many problems have arisen, however, in the use of these funds and they must be solved during the perestroyka phase.

We believe that the increment in the funds deposited by the state and labor collectives in the PCF's should be used for the resolution of particularly acute sociodemographic problems: aid to families with two or more children and the improvement of pension security. Immediate measures must be taken to secure normal population reproduction in the RSFSR and several other republics in our country and to gradually increase the average pension to approximately half the size of the average wage. In view of the projected increase in the number of pensioners and the proposed increase in pensions, both of these objectives will entail substantial PCF growth. The sociodemographic group of pensioners should also have more extensive opportunities to participate in the national economy—by expanding the list of jobs permitting the continuation of pension benefits in full and by involving elderly people who are still able-bodied in cooperative and individual forms of labor.

Social security (including temporary disability benefits) accounts for just over half of all payments from PCF's. The other half is used to satisfy such social needs as housing, public health care, education, cultural undertakings, travel, and public transport for free or on preferential terms. Because of the rapid growth of PCF's, however, some categories of laborers are now in a privileged position while others are in an extremely unfavorable position. The concept of the more efficient use of PCF's was theoretically substantiated in sociological literature back in the early 1970's (including works by the author of this article). This would entail a change in the correlation of the free and preferential services offered to all citizens at a specific level (the "socially guaranteed minimum"), which would gradually expand

as the paid services exceeding this minimum would increase. It would entail an increase in the relative number of residential construction cooperatives in housing construction, the reorganization of the prices of housing and communal services to cover the overhead costs of state housing (only one-third is covered now), the expansion of paid medical (with self-funding polyclinics) and cultural services, and the transfer of so-called organized tourism to a paid basis. From the social standpoint these and other such measures would signify the fuller realization of socialist justice and the consolidation of relationships between social groups of laborers.

The augmentation of enterprise rights and responsibilities during the transition to self-funding will lead unavoidably to more pronounced differences between labor collectives securing profitability and (given the standard deductions for sociocultural needs) having a chance to spend large sums on the construction of housing, child care facilities, preventive medical care facilities, rest homes, and so forth, and the enterprises not keeping up with contracted deliveries, producing unsalable products, and therefore earning small profits or even operating at a loss.

As we mentioned above, Lenin's definition of classes includes not only the criteria of social-class differences in the system of production relations (and therefore in politics and ideology, because they reflect economic relations), but also an analysis of the connection between these *differences* and *conflict*. According to dialectics, differences always hold out the possibility of conflict. For a long time, however, conflicts in social-class relations were not given sufficient attention in Soviet philosophical and sociological literature.³ This is a clear symptom of the major shortcomings in the social sciences that have been criticized in party documents in recent years. The documents of the 27th party congress stipulated the analysis of conflicts as the basis for the analysis of world processes and the internal development of our country.

The unity of the Soviet society, resulting from the coinciding vital interests of all of its classes and its social groups and strata, presupposes not only the existence of diverging interests but also definite conflicts. In his speech at the June (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, M.S. Gorbachev put special emphasis on these social conflicts: "The experience in perestroika, its initial phase, motivates us to also take a careful look at the existing conflicting interests of various population groups, collectives, departments, and organizations" [8, p 1].

The most acute conflict, in our opinion, is the one between the overwhelming majority of conscientious workers and the people living completely (or mainly) on non-labor income: speculators, bribe-takers, dealers in enterprise rejects, prostitutes, embezzlers of public property, parasites, etc. This category also includes the people who have turned unsupervised individual labor activity

into a source of income incommensurate with labor expenditures. All of these groups grew considerably at the time of the chronic shortages of several consumer goods and of means of production (for example, spare parts and construction materials) and the inadequate monitoring of the performance of officials in the administrative sphere, trade, public catering, transportation, etc. Because the mass media said nothing about many of these negative developments and state administrative bodies and law enforcement agencies did little to combat them, and sometimes even encouraged them, these phenomena acquired massive proportions. It is extremely indicative that the turnover in the "shadow" service sphere has been estimated by some economists at 16-18 billion rubles, while the sales volume of state consumer service enterprises in 1985 was 9.8 billion rubles [15, p 505].

This conflict is present in a slightly different form in the behavior of many workers, kolkhoz members, and employees who commit petty theft (especially in agriculture, in motor and railway transport, in trade and public catering, and in the food industry), as well as those who earn wages just by "making an appearance at work," the self-seekers, bad workmen, idlers, etc. The transfer of enterprises, kolkhozes, and organizations to full economic accountability and self-funding and the correction of shortages through the production of more consumer goods and the institution of a better pricing system should lay the basis for the elimination of these fairly widespread forms of behavior. This will also require stricter administrative control, changes in the attitudes of workers displaying deviant behavior, the mobilization of all means of indoctrinational influence, and the creation of a new moral and psychological mood in the society.

We must also consider the conflicts between the different skill categories and professions of laborers and between segments of the laboring public employed in different sectors. The mounting disparities in the distribution of income according to labor cannot be corrected instantaneously. The growth of the wage fund will depend on the portion of national income used for consumption. This will temporarily put some categories of laborers, whose wage and salary rates have been raised, in a comparatively better position than others who are still waiting for these raises. The changes in the wage system discussed above will aid in the partial resolution of these conflicts, but they will spring up again during the process of development, because the renewal of the technical base of production quickly changes the social and professional structure of society. An important way of resolving conflicts of this kind and conflicts between labor collectives in the sphere of distribution is the wage-raising method instituted in branches of physical production in the 12th Five-Year Plan, a method in which salary increases are financed by the income the collective has earned as a result of the incorporation of true economic accountability throughout the national economy.

Social conflicts will also come into being during the period of perestroika in the very attitudes of people toward this process. At the June (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, M.S. Gorbachev said that "the revolutionary changes in our society have highlighted the conflict between the need for renewal, creativity, and constructive initiative on one side, and conservatism, inertia, and mercenary interests on the other" [8, p 1]. This conflict is also personified in the form of a clash of interests. The support of the perestroika by increasingly large segments of the laboring public is coming into conflict with an obstacle in the form of the overt (or, more often, covert) resistance of perestroika by some administrators who want to retain certain privileges or have grown used to working in the old way. Furthermore, some workers who are used to earning comparatively high wages for stress-free work, regardless of its results, are covertly, and sometimes even overtly, resisting the perestroika—for example, during the institution of state acceptance standards. The changes in the objective conditions of economic management, the democratization of administration, and changes in public attitudes will gradually resolve this conflict in the perestroika phase. This resolution will require definite changes in personnel policy. Almost 40 percent of the first secretaries and around half of all secretaries of the central committees of communist parties in the union republics, kraykoms, and obkoms, and more than half of all union ministers and state committee chairmen were replaced in just 2 years [22]. The main factor in surmounting this conflict, however, will be the party's consistent efforts to democratize society.

We mentioned above that scientific analyses of changes in the social structure have displayed the characteristic shortcomings of the Soviet social sciences that have recently been mentioned in party documents. They have been reflected specifically in the failure to pay sufficient attention to classes, social groups, strata, and segments of the laboring public as subjects of the social process, to the conflicts between them, and to the methods of surmounting them, and in the narrow (economic, psychological, etc.) approach to descriptions of the lifestyles and values of social groups. In many scientific works of the 1960's and 1970's the unity of the Soviet people was given a onesided interpretation as something free of conflict, and social integration was examined in isolation from its opposite—social differentiation, which was frequently simply concealed.

In the beginning of the 1980's, on the other hand, some articles went so far in their criticism of dogmatism that they departed from the Leninist premise that class antagonism is surmounted under socialism. They sometimes asserted that antagonistic conflicts, including conflicts between managers and those they manage, continue to exist under socialism or that new ones arise [23]. The authors who make these and similar statements are inclined to portray them as examples of the "new approach" or "new way of thinking." They ignore the authoritative explanation that the party interprets the

new way of thinking as the need to take a creative approach to life's problems from the standpoint of dialectical materialism, with invariable reliance on the theoretical legacy of the founders of Marxism-Leninism. "The new way of thinking, which everyone must master, is dialectic thinking," M.S. Gorbachev said at the All-Union Conference of Social Science Department Heads [10].

Soon after the October Revolution V.I. Lenin wrote: "Antagonism and conflict are not the same thing. The first will disappear under socialism while the second will remain" [3]. Life proved that this statement was true. At the June (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, M.S. Gorbachev said: "There is no question that socialism eliminates antagonistic interests, but this well-known and true thesis does not mean that the elimination of antagonistic interests is the same as the unification or equalization of interests" [8, p 1].

The efforts to surmount the two shortcomings mentioned above will be inseparable from the creative resolution of the new problems life presents to us during the phase of this major turning point in the historical development of our society. To this end, the study of changes in the social-class structure will necessitate the development of comprehensive interdisciplinary research and broader access for scientists to the social statistics of the State Committee of the USSR for Statistics and its agencies. The scientific community is waiting impatiently for the fulfillment of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo's orders for the radical improvement of statistics in the country, higher standards in the analysis of processes of economic and social development, and the quicker and more efficient publication of statistical information [24].

The timely assessment of new trends and the compilation of sound forecasts will necessitate productive debates in the leading scientific press organs, on the condition that differing points of view will be discussed and criticized without name-calling and without over-cautious attitudes stemming from the scientific positions occupied by the authors. The democratization of science is a prerequisite for the creative development of all branches of the Soviet social sciences.

Footnotes

1. We will not discuss the ethnic structure here because it warrants separate analysis.
2. For the logical structure of Lenin's definition of classes, see [12].
3. For a more detailed discussion, see [20].

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Socioregional Differences in Public Living Conditions

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[Text] The comprehensive study of the socioeconomic sphere of human life and activity presupposes the assessment of the contents, distinctions, and interaction of at least four groups of indicators. The first are public time budgets; the second group consists of the amount, composition, and structure of material goods and services consumed; the third is the group of demographic and social living conditions—family composition, type of settlement, social affiliations, level of education, etc.; and the final group consists of the material prerequisites for human activity—income, housing conditions, the developmental level of the socioconsumer infrastructure, and others.

In our opinion, the most important factors responsible for regional differences in the level of public welfare and social development are, on the one hand, the climatic, ethnic, and traditional causes of social differentiation and, on the other, the precise assessment of socially unjustified differences. Only this approach can secure the strictly scientific substantiation of regional socioeconomic policy, the planning of balanced undertakings, and the consideration of specific local conditions in centralized planning.

The accomplishment of these scientific tasks is impeded by purely substantive difficulties and difficulties in data processing. The fact is that the system of indicators of human life and activity, consisting of hundreds of different features, is quite cumbersome. For this reason, the entire body of information can be analyzed only when the system of indicators and the group of regions in question have been reduced considerably. Besides this, the qualified interpretation of the results of "breaking down" the information is essential, and this must never be confined to the standard procedures for the combination of indicators (for example, the use of the indicators of "family expenditures on non-food items" or "total expenditures on services"), because these broad categories tend to oversimplify or even distort the distinctive features of the processes examined. A special system consisting of the most important indicators of differences in social processes and the conditions of their formation must be constructed and must be of the smallest possible dimensions while remaining as informative as possible. These requirements are satisfied best by the multidimensional statistical (factor and cluster) analysis of regional differences in the level of public welfare and social development.

Urban families in 39 oblasts of the RSFSR were chosen as the objects of our investigation. It was not a random choice because all of the variety of interacting natural, ethnic, historical, social, and other conditions of human life is most clearly apparent in the RSFSR. This is the location of the megazones of Moscow and Leningrad, where living conditions are unique in many respects and have not been analyzed in depth. Statistical agencies in all of these regions keep records of public income, consumption patterns, and time budgeting.

The set of indicators used in our study included the following groups of variables: 1. Time budgets of working family members; 2. family supply of items for cultural and personal use; 3. total living area; 4. type of dwelling and amenities; 5. number of communication enterprises; 6. development of consumer services; 7. development of trade; 8. development of public health establishments; 9. development of artistic and cultural establishments; 10. availability of child care facilities; 11. development of intra-urban public transport.

In all, 80 indicators were used. The calculation sequence consisted of four stages. Several options for the factor analysis of the complete body of information were

derived during the first. The final composition and number of factors were determined in accordance with stability criteria—i.e., the possibility of the substantive interpretation of factors and their combined influence in the overall dispersion of data. Four factors were eventually defined as determinants of regional differences in human life and activity.

The arrangement of factors in order of declining influence in the total dispersion of indicators helped us to establish their degree of importance in the differentiation of living conditions. The first factor, the most informative in terms of meaningful characteristics, is the factor of the development of trade and consumer services. The second explains differences between regions primarily in terms of total available housing and communal amenities. The third and fourth factors, responsible for a comparatively low percentage of distinctions (19 percent of the total dispersion of indicators), are the factors of the development of the social infrastructure and the public supply of household items. In all, these factors represented 67 percent of the total dispersion of data, indicating an acceptable level of informational loss.

The next stage of calculations was connected with the assessment of various systems for the classification of the regions in question, based on the most widely varying indicators of living conditions. The calculations were made with the aid of cluster analysis. Different options were secured by changing the composition and number of factors in the taxonomic system and by choosing different systems of measurement. The resulting breakdowns were virtually identical, attesting to the stability of clusters.¹

One of the interesting and perhaps unexpected results of the taxonomic process was the correspondence of the resulting breakdown to the geographic location of regions. The first cluster, for example, is made up of neighboring oblasts in the northern zone of the European RSFSR, constituting a single economic region. The second covers a broad belt of oblasts stretching from western Siberia to the Far East. It is not a completely integral region because a lack of information caused the "exclusion" of Tyumen Oblast and the Buryat ASSR. The third cluster consists of oblasts in the southern RSFSR, making up a single geographic region, and the final and fourth cluster consists of the giant cities of Moscow and Leningrad. Several oblasts did not fit into any of the categories and combined to make up a system of "forced-out" points. They included Bryansk, Kuybyshev, Leningrad, Moscow, Murmansk, and Tyumen oblasts, Krasnodar Kray, and the Chechen-Ingush, Buryat, and Yakut ASSR's.

The geographic balance of the resulting breakdown suggests the possible existence of a fifth cluster—the territory of the Yakut ASSR, the Chukotsk Autonomous

Okrug, and Magadan and Kamchatka oblasts. Unfortunately, the information needed for the analysis of these regions is lacking, with the exception of the Yakut ASSR, making up a "forced-out point."

The final stage of the work entailed calculations of indicators common to all of the oblasts and regions in a cluster and the use of these calculations to determine the average values of comparative differences in the socioeconomic development of regions. The complete cycle of calculations resulted in an intelligible description of territorial distinctions in socioeconomic development (see table).

Comparison of Indicators of Regional Differences in Living Conditions of Population of Oblasts in RSFSR

Indicators of living conditions	Point value of indicators			
	Cluster I	Cluster II	Cluster III	Cluster IV
Family supply of items for cultural and personal use	3	1	4	2
Breakdown				
Cultural	2	3	4	1
Personal	3	1	4	2
Transport vehicles	3	1	2	4
Available housing	2	4	3	1
Type of dwelling and amenities	4	3	2	1
Number of communication enterprises	2	4	3	1
Development of consumer services	2	3	4	1
Development of trade	3	2	4	1
Development of club network	1	2	3	4
Available child care facilities	1	3	4	2
Development of intra-urban public transport	4	3	2	1
Total points	32	33	43	22
Overall socioeconomic ranking of cluster	2	3	4	1

Predictably, Moscow and Leningrad were distinguished by the most highly developed social infrastructure. It is true that the giant cities ranked last in terms of two indicators—the number of transport vehicles owned by families and the development of cultural establishments. Incidentally, this is easy to explain. On the one hand, the

lower—although only to an insignificant degree—level of automobile ownership in Moscow and Leningrad is justified to some extent by the better indicators of the development of municipal public transport. On the other, the motorcycle's unpretentious appearance and ability to handle all types of terrain have made it a traditional and popular means of transport in small towns. As for culture and the arts, the apparent lag in Moscow and Leningrad was connected with the use of only two indicators in the study—the developmental level of the networks of movie projectors and clubs. In Moscow and Leningrad movies are shown in large theaters, however, whereas the projectors in small and medium-sized cities are located in small buildings and are naturally more numerous. In all other respects, the great cultural centers of Moscow and Leningrad are the indisputable leaders in this field.

They are followed in the developmental level of conditions of human life and activity by the oblasts of the first cluster, making up northern Russia. Here priority was assigned to the development of establishments in the socioconsumer infrastructure—child care, cultural, communications, consumer service, and public health establishments. The second cluster, consisting of oblasts in Siberia and the Far East, was distinguished by a high level of public ownership of durable goods, especially household appliances and personal transport vehicles. This is consistent with the high indicators of retail trade development in the region. The southern oblasts of the European RSFSR, making up the third cluster, had a comparatively developed system of public transport and fairly high indicators of communal amenities. In terms of all other indicators, conditions for the public's use of time in this region are inferior to those in other oblasts in Russia.

Regional differences in human life and activity as a whole correspond to specific indicators of time use. In our opinion, workers and employees in Moscow and Leningrad have the most balanced time budgets. They are also distinguished by the most progressive balance of work time—i.e., maximum expenditures of labor in national production combined with minimum expenditures in housework and private farming. The quantitative correlation between these indicators was 1:041 for Moscow and Leningrad, whereas it was 1:048 in the first cluster, 1:051 in the second, and 1:047 in the third. In other words, workers and employees in the giant cities assigned priority to highly effective, socially organized labor in the use of their time at the expense of unproductive housework.

Although the total amount of leisure time was the same in all of the regions in question (with the exception of oblasts in the first cluster, where inhabitants had around 1 hour a week less leisure time), the use of leisure time differs considerably in Moscow and Leningrad. Here the more meaningful leisure pursuits are more highly developed. More time is spent here than in other parts of Russia on academic studies and social work, and people

here spend more time playing sports, traveling, and taking walks and spend less time in passive pursuits (watching television, listening to the radio, or just sitting and doing nothing). These took up 1.5-2 hours more a week in all other cities in the republic.

The relatively high level of development of the socioconsumer infrastructure in the regions of the first type is the reason why its inhabitants spend less time doing housework. The population of this region spends less time shopping and visiting various service establishments, spending an average of 1-1.5 hours a week less on household affairs than the inhabitants of the first and second groups of regions. The inhabitants of the northern oblasts, however, have less free time than all the rest.

The indicators of the ways in which inhabitants of the second group spend their time are related to their demographic peculiarities. There are many more families with small children here than in other oblasts. Of course, more time is spent raising and caring for children. This also increases the time spent on cooking, laundry, etc. Academic studies, self-education, and lectures in libraries and reading rooms play an important part in the life of young parents.

The inhabitants of this region displayed particularly high indicators of cultural consumption, and in all of the forms taken into account in our study—movies, plays, concerts, sports, hobbies, and the reading of newspapers, magazines, and works of literature. This obviously means that they have to spend less time on other pursuits.

There were no clearly defined distinctive features in the living conditions and activities of the population of the third cluster. Indicators were close to the average for virtually each item on the time budget. The only distinctive feature was the population's preference for relatively passive leisure activities: watching television, listening to the radio, and just relaxing. They spent 1.5-2.5 hours more on all of these activities combined than the inhabitants of other regions. In our opinion, this is due to a certain degree of inertia. In other words, the existence of various conditions does not guarantee that they will be utilized. For this reason, planning agencies should not only concern themselves with the creation of the objective prerequisites for the more intelligent use of time, but should also take subjective and traditional factors of the way of life into account and put special emphasis on sociopolitical, propaganda, and indoctrinational measures.

The results of the study of socioeconomic regions with the use of the methods of multidimensional statistical analysis indicate that this approach is quite promising. Its success will depend largely on the quality of initial information and on the continued improvement of budgeting statistics.

Footnotes

1. It is interesting that the composition of the clusters derived as a result of the taxonomic comparison of the first two factors and all four factors coincided completely. In our opinion, this provides sufficient proof, on the one hand, of the highly informative nature of the first factors and, on the other, of taxonomic stability.

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Experimental Exposition of Informal Youth Associations

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 87 (signed
to press 8 Sep 87) pp 56-62

[Article by Igor Yuryevich Sundiyev, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent of the Moscow Higher Militia School of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and militia major. This is his first contribution to our journal]

[Text] The so-called informal youth associations are arousing stronger and stronger emotions, and this is not only and not so much a matter of their outward eccentricity. Even if we cannot accept it, we are used to it. In addition, we are gradually becoming more aware of the fact that the non-conformist behavior of the "sons" is connected to a considerable extent with shortcomings in the performance of the "fathers," a result of mistakes in upbringing in the broad sense of the term, as the process of the socialization of the individual, the creation of the necessary production-economic, social, and political conditions with the ultimate aim of the development of civic virtues, culture, will, and higher expectations, and the integration of the individual into the social structure [1]. But the main thing that disturbs the participants in the arguments over these groups and simply frightens many of them is the reluctance of informal groups to have anything to do with traditional institutions and values and their desire to create something of their own.

We will attempt to describe the social image of various informal youth associations on the basis of personal observations, personal experience in working with youth and with juvenile affairs officials, and an analysis of reports in the mass media.

No single social organization, not even the most perfect one, can satisfy all of the social and psychological needs of the individual. Social groups supplement one another. The common opinion that "nothing like this ever existed before, because the Komsomol and the Pioneer organization satisfied all of the needs of young people" is far from the truth. First of all, informal youth associations have always existed, covering a fairly broad range: from

the "Timur gangs" to the "Tishinskiy" and "Mar-yinskiy" groups. Second, it is wrong to ignore concrete historical conditions. During the first years of the Komsomol's existence, in addition to ideological and social unity there was a budding psychological unity, based on the differences between "us" and "them"—those who were struggling for the construction of a new society and those who were impeding it. People found self-expression in struggle, communicated only with people who shared their own views, and there was no room for compromise. This was dictated by the times. By the end of the 1950's the situation had changed. Ideological unity still existed, but the basis for psychological consolidation was different. This was when the dramatic growth of the cities began and familiar stereotypes and lifestyles were questioned. The development of television increased the importance of the mass media. The need for psychological unity, however, did not disappear but became even stronger than before. It was then that the "new romanticism" was born: distant places, discoveries, battle with the elements and with oneself. It was in those years that the prototypes of today's informal youth associations took shape: *amateur glee clubs* and *tourist glee clubs*. They united students, engineers, and scientists. The songs of the "singing poets" B. Okudzhava, Yu. Vizbor, A. Gorodetskiy, Yu. Kim, and V. Vysotskiy, the poetry of A. Voznesenskiy and Ye. Yevtushenko, and the prose of M. Ancharov acquired the features of a "platform." The "new romanticism" could not solve all of the problems of youth but it marked the beginning of independent activity in the spiritual sphere and offered new bases for the psychological consolidation of the many youth groups.

The "communar" movement was born at the beginning of the 1960's. The "communars" were guided by a heightened sense of social justice in their ruthless treatment of those impeding the construction of the communist society. They included young workers and secondary school upperclassmen, but not all of them were so "radical." For many the ideals of universal love and simplicity and the emphasis on the natural were emotionally appealing alternatives to the extremely complex and pragmatic world. The first "hippie" groups were formed in the late 1960's and represented a slightly modified version of the American "flower children." Most of them were university students.

Another of the characteristic bases for informal association at that time was *rock music*. This music, which was not traditional but was accessible and emotional, echoed personal and group experiences, and had a tone of protest, is still an important part of the youth subculture today.

In the 1970's and early 1980's the social development of our country revealed signs of stagnation—formalism in the activities of social organizations, social demagoguery, and violations of the principle of social justice. An understanding of youth movements requires a special examination of the phenomenon of infantile behavior.

Behavior that seems infantile on the surface actually conceals the adaptability and flexibility of young people, their willingness to say "whatever necessary wherever necessary" while saving their own views, ideas, and aspirations for those "who will understand." For many young men and women, participation in Komsomol work began to take the form of ritual acts: "We must hold a meeting..." and, just as in the case of all other rituals, the majority did not wonder why, but attended the meetings, voted there, and even spoke at the meetings. Under the conditions of strict social control (in the family, the school, and the VUZ), this kind of dual behavior gives rise to a double standard. The same event will be assessed in different ways by the young person, depending on whether he is with his group or away from it.

The marginal standards of young people give rise to considerable emotional stress and instability, which are stimulated by the non-coinciding rates of their physiological, psychological, and social development. Dissatisfaction with their own status and with available role models, now that young people themselves have a higher level of knowledge and awareness, have caused them to not only join groups but also to form groups on the basis of **non-traditional** goals, ideas, and forms of activity.

What are the main characteristics of the informal youth associations?

Informal youth associations are formed in urban surroundings, primarily in big and giant cities and agglomerates. The groups are easily distinguished by the peculiarities of their external appearance, slang, and tastes in music. Finally, they characteristically borrow elements of their subculture and even the names of their groups from foreign youth movements. This immediately calls for a stipulation: The names of groups, such as the "hippies," "rockers," and "breakers," do not mean that they are exact copies of the Western models. Any direct comparison, not to mention judgments by analogy with the foreign groups, would be wrong. The prevailing features of each of the informal associations are the product of conditions in our own country. The numerical composition of informal associations is usually unstable, and most of them have the same structure: a small nucleus, made up of those who profess "genuine" "metallism," "system-affiliation," or "pacifism" (these people are at least 20 years old), a broader stratum of "activists" who share the beliefs of the association and observe its standards and rituals (from 17 to 20), and the mass base—people who think of themselves as members of the group but are less interested in its ideas than in other elements of the subculture: the music, the external attributes, etc. (from 12 to 17).

We will try to describe the most prevalent informal youth associations in brief.

The "*fanat*" movement, fans of athletic clubs, especially Moscow's "Spartak" club, came into being at the beginning of the 1970's. Most of the "fanats" were teenagers from 12 to 17 years of age. The purpose of the association was the emotional release experienced by sports fans during a match and during post-match festivities, the desire to stand out from the crowd and to demonstrate affiliation with the "Spartak" (or "Dinamo," "Torpedo," etc.) group with the aid of stylized clothing, scarves, banners, emblems, or badges. The sports and the sports events, however, served only as the pretext for group action.

The "fanat" movement was most popular from 1979 to 1982. It later began to decline when stricter rules of behavior in stadiums were instituted and when the first generation of "fanats" grew up. In the middle of 1986 a second generation of "fanats" revived the movement. Most of them are students in secondary schools and vocational and technical institutes in the Moscow suburbs.

The "*rockers*"¹—fans of rock music—started a movement at the beginning of the 1980's. The "rockers" can be divided into "beatlemaniacs" (fans of the "Beatles" group; secondary school and VUZ students from 16 to 22), the "hard rockers" (fans of "hard rock"—"Nazareth," "Slade," and "Pink Floyd," and the Soviet groups "Nebula," "Computer," and "Autograph"; most of them are VUZ students from 17 to 25), and the "metallists" (fans of the "heavy metal" current of rock music—"Except," "Metallica," "Motorhead," and "Scorpion," and the Soviet groups "Aria," "Black Coffee," "99%," "Martin," and "Shah"; most of these are secondary school and vocational and technical institute students from 14 to 17). The external appearance of the members of these groups could be described as a slightly modified "punk" style. They are distinguished by spiked hairstyles, frequently multicolored, and clothing with many metal accessories—safety pins, zippers, chains, dog collars, bracelets with spikes and rivets, etc.

Many "*metallists*" suffer from neuroses and a high level of anxiety. Is this a coincidence? What role does "heavy metal" play in this? Our data have led us to the following hypothesis: The "metallist" groups are something like "social pits" or "cultural ghettos" appealing to **already** neurotic teenagers with unsatisfied needs for communication and self-expression and a low cultural and educational level. Their ecstatic behavior at concerts and discos produces only a partial emotional release, and this makes them more neurotic.

The "*breakers*" are fans of break-dancing (named for its abrupt and jerky steps)—dancing with acrobatic and gymnastic elements. The first all-union break-dance festival, "Parrot-86," was held in Yurmala in summer 1986, and the second, "Breakas-87," was held in Kaunas in spring 1987. Their external appearance differs according to the elements of their dancing style: "high break" (the "robot" or "rubberman" styles)—narrow sunglasses

and gloves; "low break" ("bricks")—athletic clothing and footwear and sweat-bands. As a rule, the "breakers" do not use drugs, toxic substances, or alcohol and do not smoke.

Something the "fanats" and the "rockers" have in common is that most of them are young people under the age of 20 who are suffering from an acute shortage of interpersonal communication and emotional compensation. They have little interest in ideological theories and are more concerned with finding a legal outlet for their physical and emotional energy. The exact pretext—an athletic competition, "heavy metal," break-dancing, or skate-boarding—is not that important and depends on the sociocultural conditions of the members of the groups.

The "hippie" groups which sprang up in the late 1960's had divided into the "old generation," the "system," and the "pacifists" by the middle of the 1970's. The "*old generation*" is made up of young VUZ students and members of the creative intelligentsia from 17 to 25 years of age; older people have also stayed in contact with this group. Their main slogan is "only spiritual freedom is possible in a world devoid of freedom." Their declared goal is "the free development of the free man." The members of the "old generation" typically refuse to take part in social activity, have a strong interest in mysticism, Buddhism, and yoga (in a modified form), and use drugs as a "means of transcending reality." Because of their obsessive interest in drugs and meditation, many members of this group have suffered pathological mental changes. Appointments for treatment in psychoneurological clinics are regarded as status symbols by other members of the group. Their main sources of income are speculation in mind-altering substances and "panhandling" (begging).

The music of the "old generation" comes from the psychedelic cycle of "Beatles" songs. The distinguishing features of their external appearance are long hair, beards, sweatbands, jeans or canvas pants and jackets, handmade sandals (in summer), handmade jewelry (beads, amulets with mystical symbols, and arm and leg bracelets), and heavily embroidered clothing.

In the fall and winter the members of the "old generation" usually migrate to Central Asia, to the Altay, or to Tyan-Shan to meditate and then spend the summer in the Baltic region.

The "*system*" (or "*people of the system*") is made up of members of various social groups between the ages of 14 and 30: school and university students, the creative and scientific intelligentsia, and workers. Their declared goals are self-expression, spiritual emancipation, and the unification of people with similar views. The desire to find people who will appreciate and understand a particular idea, painting, or work of music is what attracts young people to the "system." In general, interrelations within the "system" are friendly and supportive. The

multitude of small groups creates a situation in which any idea or work of art is assured of support. The members are now displaying a heightened interest in religious currents and mysticism.

Regarding themselves as the intellectual elite of society, the "people of the system" view social activity as an "unavoidable ritual." Many of them are Komsomol functionaries and some are young communists. They feel that participation in the "system" compensates for the lack of opportunities for "free spiritual development." Not many are prone to drug or substance abuse.

The fundamental premises of the "pacifist" movement are the renunciation of violence, the assignment of equal responsibility to the USSR and the United States for the preservation of peace and the prevention of local conflicts, the need to eliminate all weapons, love as an alternative to hatred, etc. The "pacifists" believe that any political system is a violent system and must be opposed. Their methods of struggle include participation in the international and regional antiwar demonstrations of pacifist organizations, the refusal to serve in the army or to work for soviet and party organs and public organizations, and the propaganda of their own ideas. Different groups within this movement are "Christian pacifists," the "Shambala Group" (professing N.K. Roerich's ideas), Buddhists, and others. The peculiarities of their external appearance include long hair, beards, sweatbands, handmade sandals (in summer), handmade jewelry (necklaces, beads, and bracelets with pacifist symbols), and canvas tote-bags or backpacks covered with symbols and embroidery.

The "karate," "kung fu," and "wu hsiu" groups have the declared goals of physical and spiritual self-improvement and the mastery of various forms of self-defense. The first groups of this kind appeared at the beginning of the 1970's. Their members were from 20 to 35 and most were members of the creative and scientific intelligentsia or university students. By the beginning of the 1980's these groups existed in virtually every neighborhood in Moscow and in other big cities and were joined by many more school and university students. The average age of the members in 1982 and 1983 was 17-20.

The number of these groups is still rising. One reason is the popularity of foreign videocassettes of movies starring Bruce Lee and other superheroes. Criminal tendencies are present in these groups because karate, kung fu, and wu hsiu are not only sets of physical exercises but also systems of hand-to-hand combat which could be used for criminal purposes. Besides this, karate, kung fu, wu hsiu and so forth presuppose not only the mastery of the techniques (or tricks) of hand-to-hand combat, but also the acceptance of a specific philosophy based on Zen Buddhism, Shinto, and other Oriental religious beliefs whose main postulates are total self-denial and unconditional submission to a "guru" (mentor or teacher). The crimes committed by the members of one such group were reported in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA [2].

The "poppers" are groups of young people between the ages of 16 and 20 who regard themselves as part of the social "elite." Their behavior is guided by the belief that they must ignore negative events and take pleasure in all existing phenomena, focusing on the external signs of "eliteness": fashionable clothing and hairstyles and exaggeratedly proper speech. Their preference in music is art rock.

The "optimists" are groups of secondary school and VUZ students who want to know more about domestic and foreign policy issues. Their discussions sometimes turn into quite heated arguments, but this is as far as they have gone to date. The "optimists" do not use alcohol, drugs, or toxic substances.

Environmental protection groups ("EKO," "The Greens," "Flora," and others) unite secondary school and university students, members of the creative and scientific intelligentsia, and young workers. They are 15 or older. Their declared goals are the protection of the environment and the restoration of lost natural treasures. These groups are just starting to take action.

The historical monument preservation groups are made up of secondary school and university students and members of the scientific and creative intelligentsia. Some of them are connected with the All-Union Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments and others act independently. These groups have saved the Shcherbakov palaces, have picketed the construction of the third raceway near Lefortovo, and have held protest demonstrations against the demolition of the "Angleterre" Hotel.

The positive changes in life in our country have made youth much more active socially. Earlier informal youth associations have been transformed and we are witnessing new forms of social activity virtually every day.² Old and new youth groups are literally stretching themselves to the limit for social recognition. It is indicative that the activities of the informal groups are concentrated primarily in the particular spheres of life that arouse the greatest public concern and anxiety: the preservation of the cultural heritage, the resolution of ecological problems, the creative self-development of the individual, aesthetic education, an interest in physical culture as well as professional sports, and struggle against various crimes. In addition to its socially positive aspects, however, this activity often displays warped or deformed features.

For a long time it was the common opinion that young people under the age of 18 had only two spheres of activity: study and leisure. This disregarded the basic principle of pedagogics—the development of socially significant activity, the relevance and value of which would be clearly understandable to the individual himself. How can the energy of youth be directed toward the accomplishment of socially significant tasks? It would be

impossible and senseless to formalize existing associations and supply them with rules of behavior. Something must be done to encourage independent activity, whether it is the restoration of architectural monuments, the planning of playgrounds, the organization of exhibits and concerts, or some other activity. Such warped forms of independent activity as drug abuse, chauvinistic attacks, vandalism, and violations of socialist legality must be prevented not only by prohibitions, but also by more intensive moral indoctrination, without any scholasticism or dogmatism, but with a solid basis in real life.

Today it is impossible to make a blanket assessment of contemporary informal youth associations, but one fact is indisputable: Public organizations, soviet organs, and concerned departments must pay more attention to this "ugly duckling."

Footnotes

1. The young people known as "rockers" in foreign countries are more likely to be members of motorcycle gangs.
2. According to sample surveys, from 30 to 35 percent of the students in grades 7-10 in Moscow's secondary schools belong to various informal associations.

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Letters to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Editors as Source of Migration Information

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[Article by Ravil Talibovich Nasibullin, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent in Department of Scientific Communism of Ufa Aviation Institute imeni S. Ordzhonikidze, and author of the article in our journal "The Professional Mobility of the Intelligentsia" (1980, No 2, co-authored)]

[Text] In September 1986 KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA appealed to its readers to participate in the reorganization of the non-chernozem agroindustrial complex by moving to underdeveloped farms and assisting in their development. Within half a year more than 50,000 applications had been sent to addresses printed in the newspaper. Besides this, the editors received 1,669

letters, and the writers of these did not confine themselves to purely biographical facts but also discussed their reasons for wanting to move to the countryside and their plans for the future. A content analysis of these letters helped in determining the sociodemographic makeup of the people responding to the newspaper's appeal, their territorial affiliations, and their motives for moving. Although the writers of these letters are still not migrants in the full sense of the term (some of them might not be able to act on their wishes for various reasons), the information in the letters provides some idea of the migration patterns of the population—a complex social process requiring a variety of methods for its investigation.

Because most of the letters were written by citydwellers (63.4 percent) and the inhabitants of rural communities (19.5 percent), our discussion will apply to these categories. We will simply round out the description by noting that the return addresses also included urban settlements, armed service facilities, etc.

The letters covered a broad geographic range—virtually all parts of the RSFSR (including Moscow and Leningrad), the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and several other republics. In general, more women expressed a desire to move to the underdeveloped farms in the non-chernozem zone than men—the respective figures were 52.8 and 47.2 percent in the first group and 55.4 and 44.6 percent in the second. This might seem insignificant but for the fact that most of the farms requesting assistance have a particularly urgent need for the labor of members of the stronger sex, especially machine operators and construction workers. Kolkhoz and sovkhoz managers should carefully consider all of the possibilities for the employment of women. In our opinion, they obviously have not considered the need for educators in pre-school establishments. For example, families with a combined total of at least 580 children plan to move to 14 farms, but only four people applied for positions in kindergartens and nursery schools. Giving these jobs to migrant women could solve the problem of their employment and the child care problem.

The age-group distribution of the letter writers was the following: 6.1 percent of the citydwellers were under 18 years of age, 55.1 percent were from 19 to 28, 34.4 percent were from 29 to 49 [sic], and 4.4 percent were over 40; the respective figures for the rural inhabitants were 1.5, 73.1, 23.2, and 2.2 percent. Many of the writers in the first group between the ages of 29 and 40 had originally lived in the country, had then settled in cities for various reasons, and had now decided to move back to the country. As for the very young, some had never lived in the country but were burning with the desire to participate in agricultural growth, and many others had stayed in cities after unsuccessful attempts to enroll in VUZ's or tekhnikums, settling for jobs they had never wanted, and were now happy to test their abilities in something they knew well and had loved since childhood.

The professional composition of the writers was predictably quite varied. We singled out the following categories: I—machine operators (tractor or combine operators, chauffeurs, etc.); II—workers with a higher or secondary specialized agricultural education (zootechnicians, agronomists, veterinarians, economists, etc.); III—teachers, educators in pre-school establishments, physicians, nurses, and cultural workers; IV—representatives of various occupations in agricultural production and other spheres (milkmaids, field workers, cattle breeders, construction workers, cooks, etc.). A special fifth group consisted of the writers who were willing, in their own words, “to take any job in the country.” Most of them were unskilled laborers. The distribution of these categories by migration flows (“urban-rural” and “rural-rural”) is presented in the table.

Professional Makeup of Letter Writers, percentages

Professional groups	“Urban-rural”	“Rural-rural”
I	18.7	32.5
II	17.9	11.9
III	13.5	19.1
IV	34.2	22.3
V	15.7	4.0

When we began our examination of the letters, we assumed that most of the writers would have no family or be part of an incomplete family. It turned out, however, that complete families accounted for the highest percentage of people moving in both directions (65.9 percent of the “urban-rural” group and 51.3 percent of the “rural-rural” group). Incomplete families accounted for 15.7 percent of the first group and 13.9 percent of the second, and the respective figures for bachelors were 18.4 and 30.4 percent. (We were unable to learn the marital status of 4.4 percent of the writers from rural communities.) Members of complete families cited interesting reasons for wanting to move to the country. They essentially had two motives: the hope of solving housing problems and the wish to raise their children in rural surroundings, closer to the land, to the animals, and to nature. As far as the higher percentage of bachelors among the rural writers is concerned, we feel that this reflects the current discrepancy between the professional makeup of the rural population and its sex and age structure.

Finally, we should say a few words about the motives for moving. Above all, there were motives common to both groups in connection with the need to solve housing problems (“There is no housing,” “We are renting space in a private home,” “We have been living in various communal dwellings,” etc.). This was the motive of 23.5 percent of the urban writers and 30 percent of the rural writers. Next came the motives connected with labor (“There are no jobs in my field,” “I do not like my job,” “I do not like the working conditions,” “I have a conflict

with management,” etc.). These were the reasons cited in 12.4 percent of the “urban-rural” letters and by 31.6 percent of the “rural-rural” migrants, and almost half of them in the second group mentioned a “conflict with management”—13.4 percent.

Family circumstances (“We got a divorce,” “Our family broke up,” “We want to get away from our parents,” “We want to start a family,” etc.) were also quite typical. The distribution was approximately equal—18.6 and 19.5 percent respectively.

Patriotic feelings (“I want to go wherever a pair of working hands is needed,” “I want to be useful,” “I want to test my ability to do something of real value,” etc.) were expressed by 13.2 percent of the urbanites and 10.2 percent of the rural inhabitants.

In addition to the common motives, there were some reflecting the distinctive features of the urban or rural way of life. Some of the citydwellers wrote, for example, “I want to move to the country because I was born and raised there” (28.1 percent) or “We want to have our own subsidiary plot” (9.2 percent). Statements of this kind were virtually non-existent in letters from rural communities, but they also had many motives “of their own”: the unsatisfactory organization of varied and meaningful leisure activities, unsatisfactory conditions for cultural growth, etc. (18.7 percent).

In general, as our analysis demonstrated, letters contain information of theoretical significance and practical value. They attest to real problems connected with migration and to existing contradictions. For example, on the one hand there are regions where rural migration to the cities is still a threatening process and where farms have an acute need for additional manpower. On the other, there are many people in cities with the appropriate professional training and the desire to live and work in the country. At this time, however, there is no effective instrument for the efficient consideration and coordination of these interests. We feel that one element of this instrument could be a centralized information bank containing nationwide data on the farms needing additional manpower and the people willing to move to these farms permanently.

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“Negative” Press and the “Boomerang Effect”

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[Article by Yuriy Aleksandrovich Kovalev, candidate of philosophical sciences and research associate at the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences. This is his first contribution to our journal]

[Text] The 27th party congress said that we must “call a spade a spade and judge everything at face value.” In the spirit of this slogan a vigorous perestroika has begun in

mass news organs: The percentage of so-called negative articles has increased dramatically, but criticism or exposure does not always coincide with the ideological-indoctrinational functions of the news media. Calling a spade a spade is not a simple matter. Above all, the journalist must have a sense of responsibility and of loyalty to Marxist principles.

It would be an obvious oversimplification to seek the solution to the problem in some kind of optimal balance of "negative" and "positive" reports. In general, this kind of problem is not an "either-or" matter. A great deal depends on the type of publication, its purpose, and the genre of the article, but the main thing is that communist ideology is usually incompatible with sensationalism.

An analysis of the articles in many central newspapers (we will confine this discussion to newspapers) reveals a substantial increase in the percentage of critical reports on various aspects of the perestroika. For example, they represented 12 percent of all the reports in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in 1986, 23 percent in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 19 percent in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, and 8 percent in IZVESTIYA. Besides this, the number of critical reports varies widely depending on the genre. In KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 46 percent of the "negative" articles were informational news reports, 51 percent were discussions of a specific topic, and 3 percent were articles dealing exclusively with theory. The distribution in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA was: 34, 64.5, and 1.5 percent respectively. The reason, of course, is the higher number of articles dealing with a specific topic in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, and we did not count the articles in the first section of the weekly. In IZVESTIYA and in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA more than half of the critical articles are news reports and 46 or 47 percent are discussions of specific problems.

Obviously, generic distinctions are quite conditional in newspapers. An article dealing with a specific topic can be highly informative, while a news report can be devoid of information. The high percentage of critical articles, however, testifies that the press is indulging in sensationalism and is gradually losing its role as the educator of the masses. But after all, Western radio stations also arouse attention by "dropping bombshells," citing sensational facts, and showing people the side of our everyday life that represents deviations from the norm of the socialist way of life. For every hundred examples attesting to our successes and achievements, a single "bombshell" attesting to our shortcomings is enough to arouse suspicions about the advantages of socialism.

The solution is usually seen in the compilation of discussion articles revealing the causes of negative behavior. The negative tendencies, however, are not examined from the standpoint of the dialectics of the important and characteristic features of our order and the incidental and derivative features. As we know, one of the chief

aims of our ideological adversary is to convince the general public that all of the shortcomings and errors our party has condemned are supposedly being concealed and provide evidence of the invalidity of Marxist-Leninist theory. Effective ideological indoctrination by the news media is out of the question in this case.

The main thing is to concentrate on explaining the essence of our order instead of on surface flaws and defects. Even when V.I. Lenin was explaining the essential purpose of the New Economic Policy to the laboring masses, he had to consider the majority's inability to see the strategic line of revolutionary development behind this temporary "deviation" from the essential purpose of socialism (public ownership of the means of production) without help. In his speeches, V.I. Lenin did not try to convince the masses that no temporary deviation had been necessary or that no compromise had been made with the "private trader." No, he did something completely different, speaking of the NEP as free private trade under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat and public ownership of the means of production. He did not discuss the essential purpose of socialism in isolation, but in connection with the specific historical forms it would take. And only then did he say that more freedom for the private trader would not countermand the general party line. The situation today is similar, but the news media are not consistent enough in explaining the reasons for negative behavior in the 70th year of Soviet rule. There must be a "dialogue" with people, to convince them of the immutability of the natural laws of socialist development. This dialogue should be preceded by: a) a public information system with the aim of summarizing people's experiences and putting the emphasis in all the right places to demonstrate clearly that although the society is still not absolutely trouble-free, an uncompromising struggle is being fought for social justice; b) articles dealing with specific topics and revealing the causes of violations of the principle of social justice. It should be scheduled approximately in this way: People should be informed of current events in the morning and should then read articles on specific problems in the evening. The same readers should also be influenced by the third propaganda stratum—articles based on the Leninist logic of "dialogue." These articles must reach the same people exposed previously to the first and second "strata." Only this can avert the dangers connected with the "boomerang effect" of "negative press."

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[Text] Bazanova, F.N., "Formirovaniye i razvitiye struktury naseleniya Kazakhskoy SSR: natsionalnyy aspekt"

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